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seriously

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[Music]

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foreign

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[Music]

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thank you

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[Music]

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foreign

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I'll be having a hearing on all of the

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unidentified aerial phenomenon this

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coming week oh great um and one of them

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you come back and talk to us about it

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afterwards absolutely okay um I created

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along with uh Senator Warner and Senator

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Rubio and Senator Heinrich and some

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others an office within the dod and the

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intelligence committee specifically to

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review every unidentified aerial

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phenomenon that the military has access

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to and we have the most intense

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intensely specific technology that can

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video uh different aerial phenomenon

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that can get radar heat sensing through

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our aircraft through other radar

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detection and so we set up this office

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two years ago and during that two years

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they've reviewed over 300 different

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evidence of aerial phenomenon about half

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of them were deemed to be weather

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balloons these type of balloon

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technology perhaps detection devices

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about two dozen were deemed to be drones

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a handful were debris or birds and there

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was still 171 that they have not

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assessed what it is and so this work has

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to be done if we're going to have domain

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awareness if we're going to have aerial

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dominance if we want to make sure that

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our adversaries aren't spying on us or

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using new technologies or have aircraft

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that we don't even know how it functions

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or how fast it is or how effective it is

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that is a national security risk and so

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knowing what these aircraft are is

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essential and the military unfortunately

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just hasn't been doing that work they've

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just assumed they are non-adversarial

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because of how they fly or how they

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function but I think knowing whether you

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are being spied on through different

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kinds of technology is essential to our

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national security so this office is up

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and running I'm working with colleagues

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to make sure it's fully funded we're

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pushing the by Administration and the

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military to ask for full funding this

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let's just roll back a bit let's go back

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to February let's talk about what

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happened over Dead Horse Alaska in

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February yeah now we know that three

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objects were allegedly shot down we know

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that they were engaged with Sidewinder

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missiles by fighter jets from the U.S

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Air Force

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now what's so interesting is what I'm

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hearing about dead horse

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and this is I think perhaps where

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questions could be pertinently directed

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because although

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the particular Senator that I'm thinking

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of is a member of the Senate armed

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services committee

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they're not a member of the emerging

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threats committee so let's just flagged

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to the emerging threats committee that

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we know that there is a senator on the

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Senate armed services committee who has

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been approached by a member of the Air

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Force

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asking the committee to ask more pointed

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questions about what happened over Dead

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Horse Alaska and I'm just going to read

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out a few questions that I think should

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be asked

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why have no Congressional

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Representatives being given the

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opportunity to cite the purported

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shootdown videos shot by fighter jets in

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February during the multiple incursions

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over U.S airspace

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and as we understand its senators and

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representatives have been refused the

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opportunity to even view this Vision

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even in a secure skiff why the secrecy

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does the witness does Dr Kirkpatrick

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have any knowledge about the specific

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shoot down incident over or near Dead

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Horse Alaska in February

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what exactly did the pilot report seeing

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when he engaged the object with a

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missile

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was the object seen to actually crash or

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descend as a result of that missile

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being fired

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why is vision of that particular instant

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still being kept classified as well as

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the pilots after Action Report even to

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confidential hearings of the relevant

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congressional committees

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is the witness prepared to deny the

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reports that I'm hearing that the object

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when hit by the explosion of the Jets

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Sidewinder missile

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actually stayed in the air despite that

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direct explosion

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something was seen by the pilot to fall

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from the object that he engaged but I'm

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told the main object was not in fact

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shot done by the missile

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does the witness does Dr Sean

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Kirkpatrick deny categorically that this

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is the case if Dr Kirkpatrick is to say

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to the committee that he doesn't know

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about this incident that he hasn't

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briefed himself about this incident and

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he should be sacked immediately the

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committee should be asking for his

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resignation

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if he doesn't come into the Committee

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hearing properly briefed about the the

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three shoot down incidents over U.S in

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February

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like do you feel sort of wouldn't say

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Vindicated but it must feel good to be

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at this point where people are like well

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maybe Kevin was on to something before

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boy howdy boy do I feel Vindicated yeah

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as a matter of fact I got to tell you

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guys something there's a pretty good

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pretty good chance that I at some point

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in the future I'll be going back to

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Congress to tell my story and stuff and

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answer questions and all that but I have

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to say right now I'm in no way shippers

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form looking for compensation in any way

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right that's not what I I want the

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opposite in fact

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in fact if I get to Congress um if they

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give me the opportunity of course I'm

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going to answer all the questions tell

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the story like I just did right all that

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stuff

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but I'm going to give them two

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recommendations

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number one and you gotta remember I went

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through this experience and I have a

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master's degree in education

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I'm going to say

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um

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the need for public education about UAP

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is obvious

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let's start teaching about these things

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from grade school to high school and

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Beyond

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at all appropriate grade levels that way

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guess what happens when Mommy picks up

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Sally and Joey from school and they're

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driving home and all of a sudden Sally

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says hey look Joey it's one of those

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things we learned about in school

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is it any big deal now

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you tell me yeah what about when they

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get home and tell Dad and others is it

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any big deal now yeah same question I

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don't think so

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and and you were kind of touching on it

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and my other recommendation is going to

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be this

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forgive

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move on

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and move up

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because this is nobody's fault and

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people that like to point blame it my

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government and people that work in my

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government and somehow try to say

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they're bad

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that pisses me off

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I don't believe anything such malarkey

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no way

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people that work in government are good

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people I mean there of course there's

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exceptions but they go to work like you

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do

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from Unknown Origin that they've been

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trying and are trying to reverse

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engineer and exploit those Technologies

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understand the physics and understand

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that technology do we have that to work

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with

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I can't talk about that but the answer

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so this is from weaponized uh Jeremy

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Corbell and George Knapp's podcast

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just that answer alone yeah I mean

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and I the type of whistleblower

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protections that are available like I

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hope we can expand that so it's not just

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for UFO related stuff but also for

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surveillance yeah to protect the

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snowden's and assangeas of the world

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like we need we need that and that's why

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I think that this uh office is going to

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be successful it's because like you

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can't the people who are doing the the

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black projects need to have reassurance

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that they're not going to be screwed

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after coming forward

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and so you know this this type of

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legislation is is so key

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um I had an exchange with with melon

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recently and he actually told me to uh

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to mention this so he was saying that

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Lazar should come forward through Arrow

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because why not I mean if he was

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involved then

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he could participate in that

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organization and and put it through

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because that's the channel that we have

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now

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the idea that someone is going to come

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out and say we have downed UFOs but we

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can't talk about it

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like what does that mean do you have

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something that was unidentified that is

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from some other state some other

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government that you found and it's a

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it's unidentified

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or are you saying you have something

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from another planet there's two there's

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two very different answers right because

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the the Chinese balloons included in

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this as well so if that gets downed you

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know that's that constitutes crash

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materials right like what is a uh it's

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unidentified what does that mean but are

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you saying that you have something that

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you re you're back engineering from

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another country or are you saying you

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have something that is of

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some completely Unknown Origin like

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I think the second part of your question

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uh was related to UAP or unidentified

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aerial uh phenomenon and that UAP task

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force

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um and and as far as I'm concerned or

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I'm knowledgeable above about that I do

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believe it does involve collaborative

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inputs and

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um information exchange with all kinds

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of countries around the globe because I

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think these are not just uh solely

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um

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actions or or or uh events that have

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occurred within the con confines in the

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United States they've they've occurred

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globally and I think we're collecting

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that information uh we're sharing

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information we view that as an open and

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transparent effort and activity through

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uh through the United States Congress

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and and executed by our UAP task force

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office and so I I I would encourage

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greater uh collaboration and cooperation

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in that and particularly I think as we

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see uh various technologies that will

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help uh demystify or debunk or clarify

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um but but I think it's also important

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one of the one of the reasons that we

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are doing uh this effort is because

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National Security concerns are of

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Paramount importance and so is safety of

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flight and deconfliction and collision

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avoidance and and issues to preserve and

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protect human life so when we can uh we

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when we can better share and exchange

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information I think that's better much

285
00:29:05,149 --> 00:29:03,059
like we do in the international civil

286
00:29:08,269 --> 00:29:05,159
aviation organization or otherwise known

287
00:29:10,850 --> 00:29:08,279
as Iko uh or in any other International

288
00:29:13,130 --> 00:29:10,860
bodies as well I think there's a fertile

289
00:31:25,730 --> 00:29:13,140
an important opportunity to be pursued

290
00:31:25,740 --> 00:31:29,800
foreign

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00:31:34,490 --> 00:31:31,510
[Music]

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00:31:36,769 --> 00:31:34,500
podcast is free to listen to every week

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00:31:39,710 --> 00:31:36,779
but if you would like to help support

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the show we have a very active patreon

295
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00:31:53,630 --> 00:31:50,700
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00:31:56,750 --> 00:31:53,640
listener questions your support truly

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00:32:00,490 --> 00:31:56,760
makes the show continue and grow so to

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00:32:02,120 --> 00:32:00,500
learn more and to join visit patreon.com

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00:32:06,649 --> 00:32:02,130
somewhere Skies

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00:33:40,909 --> 00:32:06,659
[Music]

304
00:33:46,549 --> 00:33:44,090
well I'll be having a hearing on all of

305
00:33:48,590 --> 00:33:46,559
the unidentified aerial phenomenon this

306
00:33:49,850 --> 00:33:48,600
coming week oh great um and one of them

307
00:33:51,350 --> 00:33:49,860
you come back and talk to us about it

308
00:33:53,630 --> 00:33:51,360
afterwards absolutely okay

309
00:33:55,970 --> 00:33:53,640
um I created along with uh Senator

310
00:33:57,889 --> 00:33:55,980
Warner and Senator Rubio and Senator

311
00:33:59,990 --> 00:33:57,899
Heinrich and some others an office

312
00:34:02,210 --> 00:34:00,000
within the dod and the intelligence

313
00:34:04,669 --> 00:34:02,220
committee specifically to review every

314
00:34:07,549 --> 00:34:04,679
unidentified aerial phenomenon that the

315
00:34:10,430 --> 00:34:07,559
military has access to and we have the

316
00:34:15,109 --> 00:34:10,440
most intense intensely specific

317
00:34:17,389 --> 00:34:15,119
technology that can video uh different

318
00:34:18,950 --> 00:34:17,399
aerial phenomenon that can get radar

319
00:34:21,649 --> 00:34:18,960
heat sensing through our aircraft

320
00:34:23,930 --> 00:34:21,659
through other radar detection and so we

321
00:34:25,970 --> 00:34:23,940
set up this office two years ago and

322
00:34:28,450 --> 00:34:25,980
during that two years they've reviewed

323
00:34:31,369 --> 00:34:28,460
over 300 different

324
00:34:33,230 --> 00:34:31,379
evidence of aerial phenomenon about half

325
00:34:35,389 --> 00:34:33,240
of them were deemed to be weather

326
00:34:38,349 --> 00:34:35,399
balloons these type of balloon

327
00:34:42,109 --> 00:34:38,359
technology perhaps detection devices

328
00:34:45,889 --> 00:34:42,119
about two dozen were deemed to be drones

329
00:34:48,109 --> 00:34:45,899
a handful were debris or birds and there

330
00:34:51,109 --> 00:34:48,119
was still 171 that they have not

331
00:34:53,149 --> 00:34:51,119
assessed what it is and so this work has

332
00:34:54,889 --> 00:34:53,159
to be done if we're going to have domain

333
00:34:57,170 --> 00:34:54,899
awareness if we're going to have aerial

334
00:34:59,150 --> 00:34:57,180
dominance if we want to make sure that

335
00:35:02,210 --> 00:34:59,160
our adversaries aren't spying on us or

336
00:35:04,070 --> 00:35:02,220
using new technologies or have aircraft

337
00:35:05,870 --> 00:35:04,080
that we don't even know how it functions

338
00:35:08,750 --> 00:35:05,880
or how fast it is or how effective it is

339
00:35:11,870 --> 00:35:08,760
that is a national security risk and so

340
00:35:14,030 --> 00:35:11,880
knowing what these aircraft are is

341
00:35:15,730 --> 00:35:14,040
essential and the military unfortunately

342
00:35:18,250 --> 00:35:15,740
it just hasn't been doing that work

343
00:35:20,270 --> 00:35:18,260
they've just assumed they are

344
00:35:23,030 --> 00:35:20,280
non-adversarial because of how they fly

345
00:35:25,329 --> 00:35:23,040
or how they function but I think knowing

346
00:35:27,890 --> 00:35:25,339
whether you are being spied on through

347
00:35:29,329 --> 00:35:27,900
different kinds of technology is

348
00:35:31,010 --> 00:35:29,339
essential to our national security so

349
00:35:32,089 --> 00:35:31,020
this office is up and running I'm

350
00:35:33,710 --> 00:35:32,099
working with colleagues to make sure

351
00:35:35,150 --> 00:35:33,720
it's fully funded we're pushing the

352
00:35:37,609 --> 00:35:35,160
buying Administration and the military

353
00:37:47,390 --> 00:35:37,619
to ask for full funding this this year

354
00:37:51,829 --> 00:37:50,030
does our government have downed UFOs

355
00:37:53,569 --> 00:37:51,839
from Unknown Origin that they've been

356
00:37:55,370 --> 00:37:53,579
trying and are trying to reverse

357
00:37:57,170 --> 00:37:55,380
engineer and exploit those Technologies

358
00:38:00,230 --> 00:37:57,180
understand the physics and understand

359
00:38:01,250 --> 00:38:00,240
that technology do we have that to work

360
00:38:03,589 --> 00:38:01,260
with

361
00:38:04,750 --> 00:38:03,599
I can't talk about that but the answer

362
00:38:07,250 --> 00:38:04,760
is yes

363
00:38:09,170 --> 00:38:07,260
let me let me put let me ask it this way

364
00:38:11,150 --> 00:38:09,180
so there are a number of whistleblowers

365
00:38:13,430 --> 00:38:11,160
who are who have new protections they're

366
00:38:15,410 --> 00:38:13,440
lining up we've heard we know some of

367
00:38:17,270 --> 00:38:15,420
them and that we know generally what

368
00:38:19,750 --> 00:38:17,280
they're prepared to say let's say they

369
00:38:22,609 --> 00:38:19,760
tell this to Congress and Congress

370
00:38:25,190 --> 00:38:22,619
authorizes Arrow hey the stuff is over

371
00:38:28,010 --> 00:38:25,200
here go get it how does that change the

372
00:38:30,170 --> 00:38:28,020
world if we suddenly acknowledge or at

373
00:38:32,050 --> 00:38:30,180
least the government finds and locates

374
00:38:34,910 --> 00:38:32,060
and tests

375
00:38:36,770 --> 00:38:34,920
somewhat in the open these meta

376
00:38:39,589 --> 00:38:36,780
materials created by someone else

377
00:38:41,270 --> 00:38:39,599
they're not ours or entire craft that

378
00:38:43,490 --> 00:38:41,280
were built by someone else and we can't

379
00:38:45,589 --> 00:38:43,500
figure out how it how they fly how does

380
00:38:47,870 --> 00:38:45,599
that change the dynamic of this and does

381
00:38:50,390 --> 00:38:47,880
that does that answer actually answer

382
00:38:52,250 --> 00:38:50,400
the big questions who they who built

383
00:38:55,609 --> 00:38:52,260
them where they're from why they're here

384
00:38:57,829 --> 00:38:55,619
well it certainly answers

385
00:39:00,650 --> 00:38:57,839
um the sort of sneaking suspicion that

386
00:39:02,569 --> 00:39:00,660
people have had over many many many

387
00:39:04,910 --> 00:39:02,579
decades that the United States

388
00:39:07,609 --> 00:39:04,920
government is not coming out with the

389
00:39:11,030 --> 00:39:07,619
full truth of what has happened behind

390
00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:11,040
closed doors in terms of the the

391
00:39:13,910 --> 00:39:12,480
questions that you're asking about

392
00:39:14,569 --> 00:39:13,920
though

393
00:39:17,569 --> 00:39:14,579
um

394
00:39:20,390 --> 00:39:17,579
technical performance and performance

395
00:39:23,089 --> 00:39:20,400
characteristics are fundamental if if

396
00:39:26,390 --> 00:39:23,099
the analysis the level of analysis that

397
00:39:28,790 --> 00:39:26,400
has happened on these objects is

398
00:39:31,490 --> 00:39:28,800
sufficient to generate you know as I

399
00:39:33,950 --> 00:39:31,500
said physics and Engineering

400
00:39:36,349 --> 00:39:33,960
um that is a major breakthrough and that

401
00:39:40,609 --> 00:39:36,359
would be a fundamental departure point

402
00:39:42,710 --> 00:39:40,619
for Humanity because Humanity would be

403
00:42:37,250 --> 00:39:42,720
able to answer that question are we

404
00:42:40,910 --> 00:42:39,349
the hearing will come to order I'd first

405
00:42:43,310 --> 00:42:40,920
like to thank our witness Dr Sean

406
00:42:44,930 --> 00:42:43,320
Kirkpatrick for testifying here and in

407
00:42:46,490 --> 00:42:44,940
today's earlier closed session and for

408
00:42:48,530 --> 00:42:46,500
as long long and distinguished career

409
00:42:50,150 --> 00:42:48,540
both in the intelligence community and

410
00:42:52,370 --> 00:42:50,160
in the Department of Defense Dr

411
00:42:54,650 --> 00:42:52,380
Kirkpatrick is the director of the all

412
00:42:56,930 --> 00:42:54,660
domain anomaly resolution office or

413
00:42:59,089 --> 00:42:56,940
Arrow Congress established this office

414
00:43:00,530 --> 00:42:59,099
in law to get to the bottom of a very

415
00:43:03,410 --> 00:43:00,540
serious problem of unidentified

416
00:43:05,390 --> 00:43:03,420
anomalous phenomenon or UAP Dr

417
00:43:07,609 --> 00:43:05,400
Kirkpatrick has a very difficult Mission

418
00:43:09,170 --> 00:43:07,619
while we have made progress there

419
00:43:11,329 --> 00:43:09,180
remains a stigma attached to these

420
00:43:13,910 --> 00:43:11,339
phenomenon there is a vast and complex

421
00:43:15,710 --> 00:43:13,920
citizen engagement and there's also very

422
00:43:17,930 --> 00:43:15,720
challenging scientific and Technical

423
00:43:20,510 --> 00:43:17,940
hurdles so we appreciate the willingness

424
00:43:22,190 --> 00:43:20,520
of Dr Kirkpatrick to lean in on this

425
00:43:24,050 --> 00:43:22,200
issue and the work that he has

426
00:43:25,910 --> 00:43:24,060
accomplished thus far and we look

427
00:43:28,130 --> 00:43:25,920
forward to both his opening statement

428
00:43:31,430 --> 00:43:28,140
and his presentation of examples of the

429
00:43:33,410 --> 00:43:31,440
work Arrow has done in late 2017 media

430
00:43:35,270 --> 00:43:33,420
reports surfaced about activity set in

431
00:43:37,550 --> 00:43:35,280
motion by the late long-serving Majority

432
00:43:39,470 --> 00:43:37,560
Leader Senator Harry Reid more than a

433
00:43:40,970 --> 00:43:39,480
decade ago we learned that there was

434
00:43:42,410 --> 00:43:40,980
strong evidence advanced technology

435
00:43:43,849 --> 00:43:42,420
reflected in the features and

436
00:43:46,670 --> 00:43:43,859
performance characteristics of many

437
00:43:48,650 --> 00:43:46,680
objects observed by our highly trained

438
00:43:50,630 --> 00:43:48,660
service members operating top of the

439
00:43:52,910 --> 00:43:50,640
line military equipment

440
00:43:54,770 --> 00:43:52,920
we learned that for the at least the

441
00:43:56,630 --> 00:43:54,780
past eight years military Pilots

442
00:43:58,790 --> 00:43:56,640
frequently encountered unknown objects

443
00:44:00,650 --> 00:43:58,800
in controlled airspace off both the east

444
00:44:02,870 --> 00:44:00,660
and west coast across the continental

445
00:44:05,690 --> 00:44:02,880
United States in test and training areas

446
00:44:07,609 --> 00:44:05,700
and ranges we don't know where they are

447
00:44:09,710 --> 00:44:07,619
they come from who made them or how they

448
00:44:12,109 --> 00:44:09,720
operate as former deputy secretary of

449
00:44:13,609 --> 00:44:12,119
defense David norquist observed had any

450
00:44:15,710 --> 00:44:13,619
of these objects had the label made in

451
00:44:17,450 --> 00:44:15,720
China there would be an uproar in the

452
00:44:19,370 --> 00:44:17,460
government and media there would be no

453
00:44:21,349 --> 00:44:19,380
stone unturned and no efforts spared to

454
00:44:22,790 --> 00:44:21,359
find out what we were dealing with we

455
00:44:24,950 --> 00:44:22,800
can look at the recent incursion of the

456
00:44:26,510 --> 00:44:24,960
unidentified PRC high altitude balloon

457
00:44:28,550 --> 00:44:26,520
for as an example

458
00:44:30,309 --> 00:44:28,560
because and but because of the UFO

459
00:44:33,230 --> 00:44:30,319
stigma the response has been

460
00:44:35,270 --> 00:44:33,240
irresponsibly anemic and slow Congress

461
00:44:37,550 --> 00:44:35,280
established Arrow we made it clear that

462
00:44:39,170 --> 00:44:37,560
we expect vigorous action we added very

463
00:44:41,630 --> 00:44:39,180
substantial initial funding for the

464
00:44:43,550 --> 00:44:41,640
office but despite our best efforts the

465
00:44:45,829 --> 00:44:43,560
president's budget for fiscu is 23 and

466
00:44:47,750 --> 00:44:45,839
24 requested only enough funding to

467
00:44:49,970 --> 00:44:47,760
defray the operating expenses of Arrow

468
00:44:51,290 --> 00:44:49,980
it included almost no funds to sustain

469
00:44:52,670 --> 00:44:51,300
the critical research and development

470
00:44:54,530 --> 00:44:52,680
necessary to support a serious

471
00:44:56,390 --> 00:44:54,540
investigation it took a letter to

472
00:44:58,490 --> 00:44:56,400
secretary Austin from Senator Rubio and

473
00:45:00,230 --> 00:44:58,500
me and 14 other Senators to get the

474
00:45:02,450 --> 00:45:00,240
office temporary relief for the current

475
00:45:05,150 --> 00:45:02,460
fiscal year in this hearing I tend to

476
00:45:06,770 --> 00:45:05,160
probe a series of specific issues in the

477
00:45:08,690 --> 00:45:06,780
recent incidents where multiple objects

478
00:45:10,250 --> 00:45:08,700
were shot down over North America it

479
00:45:12,589 --> 00:45:10,260
seemed that Pentagon leadership did not

480
00:45:14,510 --> 00:45:12,599
turn to Aero office to play a leading

481
00:45:15,950 --> 00:45:14,520
role in advising the combatant commander

482
00:45:17,390 --> 00:45:15,960
we need to know whether this will

483
00:45:19,370 --> 00:45:17,400
continue we need to know whether the

484
00:45:20,930 --> 00:45:19,380
leadership and DOD will bring Arrow into

485
00:45:23,030 --> 00:45:20,940
the decision-making process in a visible

486
00:45:24,710 --> 00:45:23,040
way and we need to know what role Arrow

487
00:45:27,470 --> 00:45:24,720
will play in interagency coordination

488
00:45:29,750 --> 00:45:27,480
after the NSC working group just fans

489
00:45:31,430 --> 00:45:29,760
in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense

490
00:45:33,650 --> 00:45:31,440
and intelligence authorization acts

491
00:45:35,390 --> 00:45:33,660
Congress established a direct reporting

492
00:45:37,550 --> 00:45:35,400
chain from the arrow director to the

493
00:45:38,990 --> 00:45:37,560
deputy secretary of defense the role of

494
00:45:40,790 --> 00:45:39,000
the office of the under secretary of

495
00:45:42,589 --> 00:45:40,800
defense for intelligence and security is

496
00:45:44,630 --> 00:45:42,599
limited to providing administrative

497
00:45:47,450 --> 00:45:44,640
support we need to know how this

498
00:45:49,370 --> 00:45:47,460
direction is being implemented UAP are

499
00:45:51,410 --> 00:45:49,380
frequently observed flying in extremely

500
00:45:53,089 --> 00:45:51,420
high or very low speeds and come in

501
00:45:55,390 --> 00:45:53,099
various sizes and shapes during the

502
00:45:58,250 --> 00:45:55,400
recent shootdowns over North America DOD

503
00:45:59,990 --> 00:45:58,260
disclosed that filters on radar systems

504
00:46:01,670 --> 00:46:00,000
were adjusted to allow for detection and

505
00:46:03,589 --> 00:46:01,680
tracking of diverse sets of objects for

506
00:46:05,390 --> 00:46:03,599
the first time while opening the

507
00:46:07,849 --> 00:46:05,400
aperture can overload the real-time

508
00:46:09,589 --> 00:46:07,859
analytic process we cannot keep turning

509
00:46:12,109 --> 00:46:09,599
a blind eye to surveillance data that is

510
00:46:13,609 --> 00:46:12,119
critical to detecting attracting UAP we

511
00:46:15,109 --> 00:46:13,619
need to know whether Dr Kirkpatrick

512
00:46:17,510 --> 00:46:15,119
could achieve the necessary control over

513
00:46:19,490 --> 00:46:17,520
sensor filters and the storage and

514
00:46:22,069 --> 00:46:19,500
access to Raw surveillance data to find

515
00:46:24,170 --> 00:46:22,079
UAP anomalies finally one of the tasks

516
00:46:26,690 --> 00:46:24,180
Congress set for Arrow is serving as an

517
00:46:28,309 --> 00:46:26,700
open door for Witnesses of UAP events or

518
00:46:30,950 --> 00:46:28,319
participants in government activities

519
00:46:32,930 --> 00:46:30,960
related to uaps to come forward securely

520
00:46:34,910 --> 00:46:32,940
and disclose what they know without fear

521
00:46:36,650 --> 00:46:34,920
of Retribution for any possible

522
00:46:38,450 --> 00:46:36,660
violations of previously signed

523
00:46:40,730 --> 00:46:38,460
non-disclosure agreements Congress

524
00:46:42,890 --> 00:46:40,740
mandated that arrow set up a publicly

525
00:46:45,109 --> 00:46:42,900
discoverable and accessible process for

526
00:46:46,910 --> 00:46:45,119
safe disclosure while we know that Arrow

527
00:46:48,890 --> 00:46:46,920
has already conducted a significant in a

528
00:46:50,569 --> 00:46:48,900
number of interviews many referred by

529
00:46:52,970 --> 00:46:50,579
Congress we need to set up a public

530
00:46:55,069 --> 00:46:52,980
process that that and we need to know

531
00:46:56,329 --> 00:46:55,079
where that effort stands with that I'd

532
00:46:58,309 --> 00:46:56,339
like to turn to Senator Ernst for her

533
00:47:00,710 --> 00:46:58,319
opening statement thank you madam chair

534
00:47:03,589 --> 00:47:00,720
and thank you Dr Kirkpatrick for your

535
00:47:05,990 --> 00:47:03,599
testimony today I'll keep these remarks

536
00:47:08,630 --> 00:47:06,000
very brief so that we have maximum time

537
00:47:10,490 --> 00:47:08,640
for your briefing the recent Downing of

538
00:47:12,050 --> 00:47:10,500
the Chinese surveillance surveillance

539
00:47:14,329 --> 00:47:12,060
balloon and three other objects

540
00:47:17,210 --> 00:47:14,339
underscores the need for domain

541
00:47:19,490 --> 00:47:17,220
awareness adversaries like China and

542
00:47:22,490 --> 00:47:19,500
Russia are working to hold U.S interests

543
00:47:25,609 --> 00:47:22,500
including our homeland at risk that's

544
00:47:27,650 --> 00:47:25,619
why your testimony is so important and I

545
00:47:30,109 --> 00:47:27,660
so look forward to a progress update on

546
00:47:31,849 --> 00:47:30,119
the establishment of your office as

547
00:47:33,829 --> 00:47:31,859
members know your office evolved from

548
00:47:36,710 --> 00:47:33,839
the navy-led unidentified aerial

549
00:47:39,170 --> 00:47:36,720
phenomena task force to the all-domain

550
00:47:42,050 --> 00:47:39,180
anomalous resolution office known as

551
00:47:44,829 --> 00:47:42,060
Arrow Dr Kirkpatrick your extensive

552
00:47:48,410 --> 00:47:44,839
background in science and technology

553
00:47:50,270 --> 00:47:48,420
research and development and space makes

554
00:47:53,030 --> 00:47:50,280
you well suited to discuss these

555
00:47:55,670 --> 00:47:53,040
emerging challenges my priority is that

556
00:47:59,030 --> 00:47:55,680
we understand the full range of threats

557
00:48:01,309 --> 00:47:59,040
posed by our adversaries in all domains

558
00:48:04,069 --> 00:48:01,319
that is what the Joint Force needs to be

559
00:48:06,470 --> 00:48:04,079
prepared to fight and win in defense of

560
00:48:08,390 --> 00:48:06,480
our nation this committee needs to know

561
00:48:11,030 --> 00:48:08,400
about Chinese or Russian advanced

562
00:48:13,130 --> 00:48:11,040
technology programs to exploit our

563
00:48:15,650 --> 00:48:13,140
vulnerabilities and it needs to know

564
00:48:18,050 --> 00:48:15,660
whether your office along with the IC

565
00:48:20,630 --> 00:48:18,060
has detected potential Chinese or

566
00:48:23,270 --> 00:48:20,640
Russian capabilities to surveil or

567
00:48:26,050 --> 00:48:23,280
attack us finally we need to ensure

568
00:48:29,809 --> 00:48:26,060
efficient interagency coordination

569
00:48:33,230 --> 00:48:29,819
multiple elements of the dod and IC own

570
00:48:36,230 --> 00:48:33,240
a piece of this mission to add value

571
00:48:38,630 --> 00:48:36,240
arrows efforts cannot be redundant with

572
00:48:41,270 --> 00:48:38,640
others thank you again we look forward

573
00:48:43,370 --> 00:48:41,280
to your testimony

574
00:48:45,470 --> 00:48:43,380
Dr Kirkpatrick you can give your

575
00:48:47,990 --> 00:48:45,480
testimony

576
00:48:49,970 --> 00:48:48,000
thank you chairwoman Jewel brand ranking

577
00:48:51,470 --> 00:48:49,980
member Ernst distinguished members of

578
00:48:53,089 --> 00:48:51,480
the subcommittee

579
00:48:55,910 --> 00:48:53,099
it's a privilege to be here today to

580
00:48:57,710 --> 00:48:55,920
testify on the defense defense's efforts

581
00:48:58,790 --> 00:48:57,720
to address unidentified anomalous

582
00:49:00,710 --> 00:48:58,800
phenomena

583
00:49:02,630 --> 00:49:00,720
first I want to thank Congress for its

584
00:49:04,010 --> 00:49:02,640
extensive and continued partnership as

585
00:49:06,589 --> 00:49:04,020
the department works to better

586
00:49:08,210 --> 00:49:06,599
understand and respond to UAP in an

587
00:49:09,829 --> 00:49:08,220
effort to minimize Technical and

588
00:49:12,530 --> 00:49:09,839
intelligence surprise

589
00:49:14,510 --> 00:49:12,540
unidentified objects in any domain pose

590
00:49:17,329 --> 00:49:14,520
potential risks to Safety and Security

591
00:49:18,589 --> 00:49:17,339
particularly from military personnel and

592
00:49:21,410 --> 00:49:18,599
capabilities

593
00:49:24,290 --> 00:49:21,420
Congress and DOD agree that UAP cannot

594
00:49:26,150 --> 00:49:24,300
remain unexamined or unaddressed

595
00:49:27,890 --> 00:49:26,160
we are grateful for sustained

596
00:49:29,990 --> 00:49:27,900
Congressional engagement on this issue

597
00:49:31,910 --> 00:49:30,000
which paved the way for the dod's

598
00:49:34,849 --> 00:49:31,920
establishment of the all-domain anomaly

599
00:49:37,490 --> 00:49:34,859
resolution office in July of last year

600
00:49:40,190 --> 00:49:37,500
though arrow is still a young office the

601
00:49:42,050 --> 00:49:40,200
spotlight on UAP in recent months

602
00:49:44,690 --> 00:49:42,060
underscores the importance of its work

603
00:49:46,309 --> 00:49:44,700
and the need for UAP to be taken

604
00:49:47,690 --> 00:49:46,319
seriously as a matter of National

605
00:49:49,430 --> 00:49:47,700
Security

606
00:49:52,250 --> 00:49:49,440
all leadership that I've had the

607
00:49:55,430 --> 00:49:52,260
pleasure of working with whether DOD IC

608
00:49:57,349 --> 00:49:55,440
doe civil scientific or industrial view

609
00:49:58,730 --> 00:49:57,359
Congress as a critical partner in this

610
00:50:01,309 --> 00:49:58,740
endeavor

611
00:50:03,410 --> 00:50:01,319
Arrow has accomplished much in the last

612
00:50:05,390 --> 00:50:03,420
nine months since it was established the

613
00:50:07,849 --> 00:50:05,400
Aero team of more than three dozen

614
00:50:10,430 --> 00:50:07,859
experts is organized around four

615
00:50:12,589 --> 00:50:10,440
functional areas operations scientific

616
00:50:14,569 --> 00:50:12,599
research integrated analysis and

617
00:50:16,490 --> 00:50:14,579
strategic Communications

618
00:50:18,109 --> 00:50:16,500
in the nine months since era's

619
00:50:21,829 --> 00:50:18,119
establishment we've taken important

620
00:50:23,990 --> 00:50:21,839
steps to involve and improve UAP data

621
00:50:26,870 --> 00:50:24,000
collection standardize the Department's

622
00:50:28,550 --> 00:50:26,880
UAP internal reporting requirements and

623
00:50:31,370 --> 00:50:28,560
Implement a framework for rigorous

624
00:50:33,710 --> 00:50:31,380
scientific and intelligence analysis

625
00:50:36,290 --> 00:50:33,720
allowing us to resolve cases in a

626
00:50:38,690 --> 00:50:36,300
systematic and prioritized manner

627
00:50:40,670 --> 00:50:38,700
meanwhile consistent with legislative

628
00:50:43,190 --> 00:50:40,680
direction arrow is also carefully

629
00:50:45,170 --> 00:50:43,200
reviewing and researching the U.S

630
00:50:46,609 --> 00:50:45,180
government's UAP related historical

631
00:50:48,829 --> 00:50:46,619
record

632
00:50:50,329 --> 00:50:48,839
arrow is leading a focused effort to

633
00:50:52,010 --> 00:50:50,339
better characterize understand and

634
00:50:54,530 --> 00:50:52,020
attribute UAP

635
00:50:58,069 --> 00:50:54,540
with priority given the UAP reports by

636
00:50:59,870 --> 00:50:58,079
DOD and IC Personnel in or near areas of

637
00:51:02,630 --> 00:50:59,880
National Security importance

638
00:51:03,530 --> 00:51:02,640
DOD fully appreciates the eagerness from

639
00:51:05,809 --> 00:51:03,540
many

640
00:51:07,250 --> 00:51:05,819
quarters especially here in Congress and

641
00:51:09,890 --> 00:51:07,260
in the American public to quickly

642
00:51:11,870 --> 00:51:09,900
resolve every UAP encountered across the

643
00:51:12,770 --> 00:51:11,880
globe from the distant pass through

644
00:51:14,990 --> 00:51:12,780
today

645
00:51:17,750 --> 00:51:15,000
it's important to note however

646
00:51:19,910 --> 00:51:17,760
arrow is the culmination of Decades of

647
00:51:21,650 --> 00:51:19,920
DOD intelligence community and

648
00:51:23,930 --> 00:51:21,660
congressionally directed efforts to

649
00:51:25,849 --> 00:51:23,940
successfully resolve UAP encountered

650
00:51:28,609 --> 00:51:25,859
first and foremost by U.S military

651
00:51:29,990 --> 00:51:28,619
personnel specifically Navy and Air

652
00:51:32,390 --> 00:51:30,000
Force pilots

653
00:51:34,670 --> 00:51:32,400
the law establishing arrow is ambitious

654
00:51:37,490 --> 00:51:34,680
and it will take time to realize the

655
00:51:40,910 --> 00:51:37,500
full mission we cannot answer Decades of

656
00:51:43,430 --> 00:51:40,920
questions about UAP all at once but we

657
00:51:45,049 --> 00:51:43,440
must begin somewhere while I assure you

658
00:51:47,690 --> 00:51:45,059
that Arrow will follow scientific

659
00:51:50,270 --> 00:51:47,700
evidence wherever it leads I ask for

660
00:51:51,890 --> 00:51:50,280
your patience as DOD first prioritizes

661
00:51:54,170 --> 00:51:51,900
Safety and Security of our military

662
00:51:55,430 --> 00:51:54,180
personnel and installations in all

663
00:51:58,069 --> 00:51:55,440
domains

664
00:52:00,410 --> 00:51:58,079
after all a UAP encountered first by

665
00:52:02,690 --> 00:52:00,420
highly capable DOD and IC platforms

666
00:52:05,569 --> 00:52:02,700
featuring the nation's most advanced

667
00:52:08,150 --> 00:52:05,579
sensors are those UAP most likely to be

668
00:52:09,470 --> 00:52:08,160
resolved by my office assuming the data

669
00:52:11,990 --> 00:52:09,480
can be collected

670
00:52:14,150 --> 00:52:12,000
if Arrow succeeds in first improving the

671
00:52:16,430 --> 00:52:14,160
ability of military personnel to quickly

672
00:52:18,890 --> 00:52:16,440
and confidently resolve UAP they

673
00:52:20,870 --> 00:52:18,900
encounter I believe that in time we will

674
00:52:22,250 --> 00:52:20,880
have greatly Advanced the capability of

675
00:52:24,349 --> 00:52:22,260
the entire United States government

676
00:52:25,849 --> 00:52:24,359
including its civilian agencies to

677
00:52:28,430 --> 00:52:25,859
resolve UAP

678
00:52:31,130 --> 00:52:28,440
however it would be naive to believe

679
00:52:33,349 --> 00:52:31,140
that the resolution of all UAP can be

680
00:52:34,130 --> 00:52:33,359
solely accomplished by the dod and IC

681
00:52:36,109 --> 00:52:34,140
alone

682
00:52:38,089 --> 00:52:36,119
we will need to prioritize collection

683
00:52:39,770 --> 00:52:38,099
and leverage authorities for monitoring

684
00:52:40,910 --> 00:52:39,780
all domains within the continental

685
00:52:43,010 --> 00:52:40,920
United States

686
00:52:44,809 --> 00:52:43,020
Arrow's ultimate success will require

687
00:52:47,450 --> 00:52:44,819
Partnerships with the interagency

688
00:52:49,130 --> 00:52:47,460
industry Partners Academia and the

689
00:52:50,150 --> 00:52:49,140
scientific Community as well as the

690
00:52:51,890 --> 00:52:50,160
public

691
00:52:54,230 --> 00:52:51,900
Aero is partnering with the services

692
00:52:55,790 --> 00:52:54,240
intelligence Community doe as well as

693
00:52:58,069 --> 00:52:55,800
civil partners and across the U.S

694
00:52:59,930 --> 00:52:58,079
government to tap into this resources of

695
00:53:02,630 --> 00:52:59,940
the interagency

696
00:53:05,210 --> 00:53:02,640
the UAP challenge is more an operational

697
00:53:06,710 --> 00:53:05,220
and scientific issue than it is an

698
00:53:08,990 --> 00:53:06,720
intelligence issue

699
00:53:10,910 --> 00:53:09,000
as such we are working with industry

700
00:53:13,190 --> 00:53:10,920
Academia and the scientific Community

701
00:53:15,710 --> 00:53:13,200
which bring their own resources ideas

702
00:53:17,329 --> 00:53:15,720
and expertise to this challenging

703
00:53:19,549 --> 00:53:17,339
problem set

704
00:53:21,650 --> 00:53:19,559
robust collaboration and peer review

705
00:53:23,390 --> 00:53:21,660
across a broad range of Partners will

706
00:53:26,569 --> 00:53:23,400
promote greater objectivity and

707
00:53:28,910 --> 00:53:26,579
transparency in the study of UAP

708
00:53:31,370 --> 00:53:28,920
I want to underscore today that only a

709
00:53:33,650 --> 00:53:31,380
very small percentage of UAP reports

710
00:53:36,470 --> 00:53:33,660
display signatures that could reasonably

711
00:53:38,690 --> 00:53:36,480
be described as anomalous the majority

712
00:53:40,910 --> 00:53:38,700
of unidentified objects reported to

713
00:53:43,250 --> 00:53:40,920
Arrow demonstrate mundane

714
00:53:45,589 --> 00:53:43,260
characteristics of balloons unmanned

715
00:53:48,410 --> 00:53:45,599
aerial systems clutter natural phenomena

716
00:53:50,630 --> 00:53:48,420
other readily explainable sources

717
00:53:53,089 --> 00:53:50,640
while a large number of cases in our

718
00:53:56,030 --> 00:53:53,099
Holdings remain technically unresolved

719
00:53:58,309 --> 00:53:56,040
this is primarily due to a lack of data

720
00:54:00,530 --> 00:53:58,319
associated with those cases without

721
00:54:02,450 --> 00:54:00,540
sufficient data we are unable to reach

722
00:54:05,089 --> 00:54:02,460
defendable conclusions

723
00:54:07,309 --> 00:54:05,099
that meet the high scientific standards

724
00:54:09,349 --> 00:54:07,319
we set for resolution and I will not

725
00:54:10,970 --> 00:54:09,359
close a case that I cannot defend the

726
00:54:12,890 --> 00:54:10,980
conclusions of

727
00:54:15,170 --> 00:54:12,900
I recognize that this answer is

728
00:54:16,970 --> 00:54:15,180
unsatisfying to those who in good faith

729
00:54:18,770 --> 00:54:16,980
assume that what they see with their

730
00:54:21,049 --> 00:54:18,780
eyes with their cameras and what their

731
00:54:22,730 --> 00:54:21,059
Radars is incontrovertible evidence of

732
00:54:23,870 --> 00:54:22,740
extraordinary characteristics and

733
00:54:25,609 --> 00:54:23,880
performance

734
00:54:27,770 --> 00:54:25,619
yet time and again with sufficient

735
00:54:31,549 --> 00:54:27,780
scientific quality data it is fact that

736
00:54:34,069 --> 00:54:31,559
UAP often but not always resolve into

737
00:54:36,170 --> 00:54:34,079
readily explainable sources

738
00:54:38,089 --> 00:54:36,180
humans are subject to deception and

739
00:54:40,549 --> 00:54:38,099
Illusions sensors to unexpected

740
00:54:42,890 --> 00:54:40,559
responses and malfunctions and in some

741
00:54:44,930 --> 00:54:42,900
cases intentional interference

742
00:54:46,730 --> 00:54:44,940
getting to the handful of cases that

743
00:54:48,230 --> 00:54:46,740
pass this level of scrutiny is the

744
00:54:50,569 --> 00:54:48,240
mission of era

745
00:54:52,490 --> 00:54:50,579
that is not to say that UAP once

746
00:54:54,710 --> 00:54:52,500
resolved or no longer of National

747
00:54:56,990 --> 00:54:54,720
Security interest however on the

748
00:54:59,270 --> 00:54:57,000
contrary learning that a UAP isn't of

749
00:55:01,970 --> 00:54:59,280
exotic origin but is instead just a

750
00:55:03,470 --> 00:55:01,980
quadcopter or balloon leads to the

751
00:55:06,230 --> 00:55:03,480
question of who is operating that

752
00:55:08,089 --> 00:55:06,240
quadcopter into what purpose

753
00:55:10,190 --> 00:55:08,099
the answers to those questions will

754
00:55:12,530 --> 00:55:10,200
inform potential National Security or

755
00:55:14,390 --> 00:55:12,540
law enforcement responses

756
00:55:16,010 --> 00:55:14,400
arrow is a member of the Department's

757
00:55:18,109 --> 00:55:16,020
support to the administration's tiger

758
00:55:20,210 --> 00:55:18,119
team effort to deal with stratospheric

759
00:55:21,589 --> 00:55:20,220
objects such as the PRC high altitude

760
00:55:24,770 --> 00:55:21,599
balloon

761
00:55:27,470 --> 00:55:24,780
well when previously unknown objects are

762
00:55:29,569 --> 00:55:27,480
successfully identified it is Arrow's

763
00:55:32,270 --> 00:55:29,579
role too quickly and efficiently hand

764
00:55:34,370 --> 00:55:32,280
off such readily explainable objects to

765
00:55:36,170 --> 00:55:34,380
the intelligence law enforcement or

766
00:55:39,109 --> 00:55:36,180
operational safety communities for

767
00:55:41,270 --> 00:55:39,119
further analysis and appropriate action

768
00:55:44,510 --> 00:55:41,280
in other words Arrow's mission is to

769
00:55:46,609 --> 00:55:44,520
turn UAP into SCP somebody else's

770
00:55:49,309 --> 00:55:46,619
problem

771
00:55:51,170 --> 00:55:49,319
the U.S government the dod and the IC in

772
00:55:53,329 --> 00:55:51,180
particular has tremendous capabilities

773
00:55:56,690 --> 00:55:53,339
to deal with those encountered objects

774
00:55:58,190 --> 00:55:56,700
in the wake of the PRC Hab event the

775
00:56:00,170 --> 00:55:58,200
interagency is working to better

776
00:56:01,030 --> 00:56:00,180
integrate and share information to

777
00:56:04,130 --> 00:56:01,040
address

778
00:56:06,470 --> 00:56:04,140
identifiable stratospheric objects but

779
00:56:08,809 --> 00:56:06,480
that is not all arrows Lane

780
00:56:11,329 --> 00:56:08,819
meanwhile for the few cases in all

781
00:56:13,069 --> 00:56:11,339
domains space air and sea

782
00:56:15,290 --> 00:56:13,079
that do demonstrate potentially

783
00:56:17,750 --> 00:56:15,300
anomalous characteristics Arrow exists

784
00:56:20,150 --> 00:56:17,760
to help the dod IC and interagency

785
00:56:22,609 --> 00:56:20,160
resolve those anomalous cases

786
00:56:24,109 --> 00:56:22,619
in doing so arrow is approaching these

787
00:56:26,990 --> 00:56:24,119
cases with the highest level of

788
00:56:28,670 --> 00:56:27,000
objectivity and analytic rigor this

789
00:56:30,170 --> 00:56:28,680
includes physically testing and

790
00:56:32,930 --> 00:56:30,180
employing modeling and simulation

791
00:56:34,730 --> 00:56:32,940
validate our analyzes and underlying

792
00:56:36,370 --> 00:56:34,740
theories then peer-reviewing those

793
00:56:38,510 --> 00:56:36,380
results within the US government

794
00:56:40,609 --> 00:56:38,520
industry partners and appropriately

795
00:56:42,829 --> 00:56:40,619
cleared academic institutions before

796
00:56:44,809 --> 00:56:42,839
reaching any conclusions

797
00:56:46,970 --> 00:56:44,819
I should also State clearly for the

798
00:56:49,430 --> 00:56:46,980
record that in our research Arrow has

799
00:56:51,530 --> 00:56:49,440
found no credible evidence thus far of

800
00:56:54,230 --> 00:56:51,540
extraterrestrial activity off-world

801
00:56:55,849 --> 00:56:54,240
technology or objects that defy the

802
00:56:58,370 --> 00:56:55,859
known laws of physics

803
00:57:00,770 --> 00:56:58,380
in the event sufficient scientific data

804
00:57:02,809 --> 00:57:00,780
were ever attained that a UAP

805
00:57:05,210 --> 00:57:02,819
encountered can only be explained by

806
00:57:07,130 --> 00:57:05,220
extraterrestrial origin we are committed

807
00:57:09,890 --> 00:57:07,140
to working with our interagency partners

808
00:57:12,230 --> 00:57:09,900
at Nasa to appropriately inform U.S

809
00:57:14,809 --> 00:57:12,240
government's leadership of its findings

810
00:57:16,549 --> 00:57:14,819
for those few cases that have leaked to

811
00:57:19,010 --> 00:57:16,559
the public previously and subsequently

812
00:57:20,690 --> 00:57:19,020
commented on by the U.S government I

813
00:57:22,430 --> 00:57:20,700
encourage those who hold alternative

814
00:57:24,530 --> 00:57:22,440
theories or views to submit your

815
00:57:26,750 --> 00:57:24,540
research to Credible peer-reviewed

816
00:57:28,670 --> 00:57:26,760
scientific journals arrow is working

817
00:57:31,670 --> 00:57:28,680
very hard to do the same

818
00:57:32,990 --> 00:57:31,680
that is how science works not by blog or

819
00:57:34,970 --> 00:57:33,000
social media

820
00:57:37,609 --> 00:57:34,980
we know that there is tremendous public

821
00:57:40,849 --> 00:57:37,619
interest in UAP and a desire for answers

822
00:57:43,490 --> 00:57:40,859
from Arrow by its very nature the UAP

823
00:57:45,950 --> 00:57:43,500
challenge has for decades lent itself to

824
00:57:49,069 --> 00:57:45,960
mystery sensationalism and even

825
00:57:51,530 --> 00:57:49,079
conspiracy for that reason Arrow remains

826
00:57:53,569 --> 00:57:51,540
committed to transparency accountability

827
00:57:56,329 --> 00:57:53,579
and to sharing as much with the American

828
00:57:58,430 --> 00:57:56,339
public as we can consistent with Our

829
00:58:01,069 --> 00:57:58,440
obligation to protect and not only

830
00:58:03,290 --> 00:58:01,079
intelligence sources and methods but U.S

831
00:58:06,170 --> 00:58:03,300
and Allied capabilities

832
00:58:08,510 --> 00:58:06,180
however Arrow's work will take time if

833
00:58:10,730 --> 00:58:08,520
we are committed to do it right it means

834
00:58:12,109 --> 00:58:10,740
adhering to the scientific method and

835
00:58:15,109 --> 00:58:12,119
the highest standards of research

836
00:58:17,329 --> 00:58:15,119
Integrity it means being methodical and

837
00:58:19,730 --> 00:58:17,339
scrupulous it means withholding judgment

838
00:58:21,829 --> 00:58:19,740
in favor of evidence it means following

839
00:58:24,410 --> 00:58:21,839
the data where it leads wherever it

840
00:58:26,450 --> 00:58:24,420
leads it means establishing scientific

841
00:58:28,130 --> 00:58:26,460
peer-reviewed theoretical underpinnings

842
00:58:30,530 --> 00:58:28,140
of observed data

843
00:58:31,670 --> 00:58:30,540
an arrow is committed to all of those

844
00:58:33,589 --> 00:58:31,680
standards

845
00:58:36,470 --> 00:58:33,599
I'm proud of Arrow's progress over the

846
00:58:38,809 --> 00:58:36,480
last nine months months much remains to

847
00:58:41,450 --> 00:58:38,819
be done but the hard work is underway

848
00:58:43,190 --> 00:58:41,460
thank you for your continued support and

849
00:58:45,109 --> 00:58:43,200
before we turn to questions I want to

850
00:58:46,970 --> 00:58:45,119
walk you through some of our analytical

851
00:58:51,410 --> 00:58:46,980
Trends in a couple of cases that we've

852
00:58:58,250 --> 00:58:54,309
so one of the things that Arrow does is

853
00:59:00,890 --> 00:58:58,260
high integrity analysis as I've said

854
00:59:04,970 --> 00:59:00,900
this chart represents

855
00:59:07,970 --> 00:59:04,980
the trend analysis of all the cases in

856
00:59:10,789 --> 00:59:07,980
arrows Holdings right to date

857
00:59:13,490 --> 00:59:10,799
what you'll see on the left is a

858
00:59:17,230 --> 00:59:13,500
histogram of all of our reported

859
00:59:22,730 --> 00:59:17,240
sightings as a function of altitude

860
00:59:23,990 --> 00:59:22,740
so most of our sightings occur in the 15

861
00:59:26,390 --> 00:59:24,000
to 25

862
00:59:27,710 --> 00:59:26,400
000 foot range and that is ultimately

863
00:59:30,109 --> 00:59:27,720
because that's where a lot of our

864
00:59:33,109 --> 00:59:30,119
aircraft are

865
00:59:36,289 --> 00:59:33,119
on the far right upper corner you'll see

866
00:59:39,349 --> 00:59:36,299
a breakout of the morphologies of all of

867
00:59:42,109 --> 00:59:39,359
the UAP that are reported over half

868
00:59:47,390 --> 00:59:42,119
about 52 percent of what's been reported

869
00:59:49,849 --> 00:59:47,400
to us are round orb spheres

870
00:59:51,950 --> 00:59:49,859
the rest of those break out into all

871
00:59:53,710 --> 00:59:51,960
kinds of different other shapes the gray

872
00:59:57,049 --> 00:59:53,720
box is

873
00:59:59,270 --> 00:59:57,059
essentially there's no data on what its

874
01:00:01,910 --> 00:59:59,280
shape is either it wasn't reported or

875
01:00:05,569 --> 01:00:01,920
the sensor did not collect it

876
01:00:08,150 --> 01:00:05,579
the bottom map is a heat map of all

877
01:00:10,609 --> 01:00:08,160
reporting areas across the globe that we

878
01:00:13,490 --> 01:00:10,619
have available to us

879
01:00:16,309 --> 01:00:13,500
what you'll notice is that there is a

880
01:00:19,510 --> 01:00:16,319
heavy what we call collection bias both

881
01:00:23,210 --> 01:00:19,520
in altitude and in geographic location

882
01:00:25,250 --> 01:00:23,220
that's where all of our sensors exist

883
01:00:27,109 --> 01:00:25,260
that's where our training ranges are

884
01:00:30,710 --> 01:00:27,119
that's where our operational ranges are

885
01:00:33,530 --> 01:00:30,720
that's where all of our platforms are

886
01:00:37,210 --> 01:00:33,540
in the middle what we have done is

887
01:00:41,930 --> 01:00:37,220
reduce the most typically reported UAP

888
01:00:44,930 --> 01:00:41,940
characteristics to these fields mostly

889
01:00:47,390 --> 01:00:44,940
round mostly one to four meters white

890
01:00:50,329 --> 01:00:47,400
silver translucent metallic

891
01:00:52,609 --> 01:00:50,339
ten thousand thirty thousand feet

892
01:00:55,730 --> 01:00:52,619
with apparent velocities from the

893
01:00:58,490 --> 01:00:55,740
stationary to Mach 2. no thermal

894
01:01:01,190 --> 01:00:58,500
exhausts usually detected we get

895
01:01:04,190 --> 01:01:01,200
intermittent radar returns we get

896
01:01:06,770 --> 01:01:04,200
intermittent radio returns and we get

897
01:01:09,230 --> 01:01:06,780
intermittent thermal signatures

898
01:01:12,530 --> 01:01:09,240
that's what we're looking for and trying

899
01:01:12,540 --> 01:01:15,770
next slide

900
01:01:21,789 --> 01:01:18,170
so I'm going to walk you through two

901
01:01:25,490 --> 01:01:21,799
cases that we've Declassified recently

902
01:01:28,789 --> 01:01:25,500
this first one is an MQ-9 in the Middle

903
01:01:31,910 --> 01:01:28,799
East observing that blow up which is an

904
01:01:35,329 --> 01:01:31,920
apparent spherical object via EO sensors

905
01:01:39,950 --> 01:01:36,770
if you want to go ahead and click that

906
01:01:44,450 --> 01:01:42,349
you'll see it come through the top of

907
01:01:47,750 --> 01:01:44,460
the screen there it goes and then the

908
01:01:49,849 --> 01:01:47,760
camera will slew to follow it

909
01:01:52,069 --> 01:01:49,859
you'll see it pop in and out of the

910
01:01:54,589 --> 01:01:52,079
screw field of view there

911
01:01:56,329 --> 01:01:54,599
this is essentially all of the data we

912
01:01:59,270 --> 01:01:56,339
have associated with this event from

913
01:02:04,130 --> 01:02:01,309
it is going to be virtually impossible

914
01:02:06,410 --> 01:02:04,140
to fully identify that

915
01:02:08,690 --> 01:02:06,420
just based off of that video

916
01:02:12,349 --> 01:02:08,700
now what we can do and what we are doing

917
01:02:15,230 --> 01:02:12,359
is keeping that as part of that

918
01:02:18,170 --> 01:02:15,240
group of 52 percent

919
01:02:20,270 --> 01:02:18,180
to see what are the similarities what

920
01:02:22,309 --> 01:02:20,280
are the trends across all these do we

921
01:02:25,130 --> 01:02:22,319
see these in a particular distribution

922
01:02:27,770 --> 01:02:25,140
do they all behave the same or not

923
01:02:29,750 --> 01:02:27,780
as we get more data

924
01:02:32,690 --> 01:02:29,760
we will be able to go back and look at

925
01:02:35,329 --> 01:02:32,700
these in a fuller context

926
01:02:37,549 --> 01:02:35,339
how are we going to get more data we are

927
01:02:39,589 --> 01:02:37,559
working with the joint staff to issue

928
01:02:42,710 --> 01:02:39,599
guidance to all the services and

929
01:02:44,329 --> 01:02:42,720
commands that will then establish what

930
01:02:46,370 --> 01:02:44,339
are the reporting requirements the

931
01:02:48,710 --> 01:02:46,380
timeliness and all of the data that is

932
01:02:52,609 --> 01:02:48,720
required to be delivered to us and

933
01:02:54,710 --> 01:02:52,619
retained from all the associated sensors

934
01:02:56,809 --> 01:02:54,720
that historically hasn't been the case

935
01:02:59,150 --> 01:02:56,819
and it's been happenstance that data has

936
01:03:01,750 --> 01:02:59,160
been collected

937
01:03:06,549 --> 01:03:01,760
next slide

938
01:03:10,069 --> 01:03:06,559
this particular event South Asia MQ-9

939
01:03:12,410 --> 01:03:10,079
looking at another MQ-9 and what's

940
01:03:15,289 --> 01:03:12,420
highlighted there in that red circle is

941
01:03:17,809 --> 01:03:15,299
an object that flies through the screen

942
01:03:19,789 --> 01:03:17,819
unlike the previous one

943
01:03:21,470 --> 01:03:19,799
this one actually shows some really

944
01:03:24,530 --> 01:03:21,480
interesting things that everyone thought

945
01:03:26,750 --> 01:03:24,540
was truly anomalous to start with first

946
01:03:29,030 --> 01:03:26,760
of all it's a high-speed object that's

947
01:03:32,930 --> 01:03:29,040
flying in the field of regard of two

948
01:03:35,390 --> 01:03:32,940
mq-9s second it appears to have this

949
01:03:37,849 --> 01:03:35,400
trail behind it

950
01:03:41,569 --> 01:03:37,859
all right which at first blush you would

951
01:03:45,410 --> 01:03:41,579
think that looks like a propulsion Trail

952
01:03:47,150 --> 01:03:45,420
in reality if you want to play the first

953
01:03:49,670 --> 01:03:47,160
slide we'll show you what that looks

954
01:03:53,089 --> 01:03:49,680
like in real time or first video so

955
01:03:54,950 --> 01:03:53,099
we're looking at that there it goes

956
01:03:56,809 --> 01:03:54,960
once you play it again and then pause it

957
01:03:58,490 --> 01:03:56,819
halfway through

958
01:04:00,170 --> 01:03:58,500
right there

959
01:04:02,990 --> 01:04:00,180
all right if you might be able to see

960
01:04:05,569 --> 01:04:03,000
that trail there behind it

961
01:04:08,589 --> 01:04:05,579
that's actually not a real trail that is

962
01:04:11,089 --> 01:04:08,599
a sensor artifact

963
01:04:13,370 --> 01:04:11,099
each one of those little blobs is

964
01:04:15,589 --> 01:04:13,380
actually a representation of the object

965
01:04:18,289 --> 01:04:15,599
as it's moving through and later in the

966
01:04:22,670 --> 01:04:18,299
video as the

967
01:04:25,190 --> 01:04:22,680
as the camera slews that trail actually

968
01:04:29,089 --> 01:04:25,200
follows the direction of the camera not

969
01:04:31,549 --> 01:04:29,099
the direction of the object

970
01:04:33,289 --> 01:04:31,559
we pulled these apart frame by frame we

971
01:04:36,650 --> 01:04:33,299
were able to demonstrate that that is

972
01:04:38,690 --> 01:04:36,660
essentially a readout uh overlap of the

973
01:04:40,190 --> 01:04:38,700
image it's a it's a shadow image right

974
01:04:42,190 --> 01:04:40,200
it's not real

975
01:04:45,289 --> 01:04:42,200
further if you later

976
01:04:48,410 --> 01:04:45,299
follow this all the way to end it starts

977
01:04:50,210 --> 01:04:48,420
to resolve itself into that blob that's

978
01:04:52,430 --> 01:04:50,220
in that picture in the top of the right

979
01:04:54,230 --> 01:04:52,440
and if you squint it looks like an

980
01:04:55,970 --> 01:04:54,240
aircraft because it actually turns out

981
01:04:58,849 --> 01:04:55,980
to be an aircraft go ahead and put that

982
01:05:03,770 --> 01:05:01,309
so you'll see the tail sort of pop out

983
01:05:06,170 --> 01:05:03,780
there and so what you're looking at is

984
01:05:08,210 --> 01:05:06,180
this is in the infrared this is the Heat

985
01:05:10,490 --> 01:05:08,220
Signature off of the

986
01:05:12,349 --> 01:05:10,500
engines of a commuter aircraft that

987
01:05:15,890 --> 01:05:12,359
happen to be flying in the vicinity of

988
01:05:18,410 --> 01:05:15,900
where those two mq-9s were at

989
01:05:20,089 --> 01:05:18,420
why am i showing you this so the first

990
01:05:22,789 --> 01:05:20,099
one that I showed you we don't have a

991
01:05:26,210 --> 01:05:22,799
result yet right that is an unresolved

992
01:05:29,030 --> 01:05:26,220
case we are still studying this one we

993
01:05:31,130 --> 01:05:29,040
can resolve but this is the kind of data

994
01:05:33,770 --> 01:05:31,140
that we have to work with and the type

995
01:05:35,809 --> 01:05:33,780
of analysis that we have to do which can

996
01:05:38,630 --> 01:05:35,819
be quite extensive when you have to pull

997
01:05:41,630 --> 01:05:38,640
these apart frame by frame

998
01:05:44,690 --> 01:05:41,640
further we're now matching all of this

999
01:05:47,930 --> 01:05:44,700
with the models of all of those Imaging

1000
01:05:50,510 --> 01:05:47,940
sensors so that I can say I can recreate

1001
01:05:52,250 --> 01:05:50,520
this I can actually show how the sensor

1002
01:05:54,589 --> 01:05:52,260
is going to respond

1003
01:05:57,589 --> 01:05:54,599
all of these sensors don't necessarily

1004
01:05:59,690 --> 01:05:57,599
respond the way you think they do

1005
01:06:03,049 --> 01:05:59,700
especially out in the world and in the

1006
01:06:07,069 --> 01:06:04,910
and I believe that's all I have and I

1007
01:06:10,490 --> 01:06:07,079
will open it up for your questions

1008
01:06:12,829 --> 01:06:10,500
thank you so much Dr crew Patrick can

1009
01:06:16,970 --> 01:06:12,839
you just give us some raw numbers of how

1010
01:06:18,589 --> 01:06:16,980
many uaps you've analyzed how many have

1011
01:06:20,329 --> 01:06:18,599
been resolved and sort of in what

1012
01:06:22,690 --> 01:06:20,339
buckets and then how many are still left

1013
01:06:25,970 --> 01:06:22,700
to be resolved just an update from your

1014
01:06:29,109 --> 01:06:25,980
January public report where it was 366

1015
01:06:31,789 --> 01:06:29,119
or something in about 150 were were

1016
01:06:33,410 --> 01:06:31,799
balloons in about two dozen were drones

1017
01:06:37,549 --> 01:06:33,420
you know just give us an update if you

1018
01:06:43,250 --> 01:06:37,559
have one sure so as of this week we are

1019
01:06:46,730 --> 01:06:43,260
tracking over a total of 650 cases

1020
01:06:48,770 --> 01:06:46,740
now the report in January basically said

1021
01:06:51,710 --> 01:06:48,780
about half of the ones at that time

1022
01:06:54,109 --> 01:06:51,720
about 150 were balloon were likely

1023
01:06:56,690 --> 01:06:54,119
balloon-like or something like that that

1024
01:06:58,849 --> 01:06:56,700
doesn't mean they're resolved oh okay so

1025
01:07:02,329 --> 01:06:58,859
what let me let me walk everyone through

1026
01:07:04,430 --> 01:07:02,339
what our analytic process looks like

1027
01:07:07,430 --> 01:07:04,440
we have a essentially a

1028
01:07:09,890 --> 01:07:07,440
five-step process right so we have we

1029
01:07:14,690 --> 01:07:09,900
get our cases and with all the data we

1030
01:07:18,289 --> 01:07:14,700
create a case uh for that event

1031
01:07:21,170 --> 01:07:18,299
my team does a preliminary scrub of all

1032
01:07:23,750 --> 01:07:21,180
of those cases as they come in just to

1033
01:07:26,510 --> 01:07:23,760
sort out do we have any information that

1034
01:07:28,549 --> 01:07:26,520
says this is in one of those likely

1035
01:07:31,430 --> 01:07:28,559
categories it's likely a balloon it's

1036
01:07:33,349 --> 01:07:31,440
likely a balloon a bird it's likely

1037
01:07:36,170 --> 01:07:33,359
some other object

1038
01:07:40,250 --> 01:07:36,180
or we don't know

1039
01:07:42,950 --> 01:07:40,260
then we prioritize those based off of

1040
01:07:44,930 --> 01:07:42,960
where they are are they attached to a

1041
01:07:48,010 --> 01:07:44,940
national security area

1042
01:07:50,809 --> 01:07:48,020
does it show some anomalous

1043
01:07:52,789 --> 01:07:50,819
phenomenology that is of interest if

1044
01:07:55,490 --> 01:07:52,799
it's just if it's just a spherical thing

1045
01:07:58,069 --> 01:07:55,500
that's floating around with the with the

1046
01:07:59,450 --> 01:07:58,079
wind and it has no payload on it that's

1047
01:08:01,370 --> 01:07:59,460
going to be less important than

1048
01:08:02,750 --> 01:08:01,380
something that has a payload on it which

1049
01:08:04,250 --> 01:08:02,760
would be less important than something

1050
01:08:06,349 --> 01:08:04,260
that's maneuvering

1051
01:08:08,510 --> 01:08:06,359
right so there's there's sort of a

1052
01:08:12,529 --> 01:08:08,520
hierarchy of just binning the priorities

1053
01:08:14,809 --> 01:08:12,539
because we can't do all of them at once

1054
01:08:16,669 --> 01:08:14,819
once we do that and we prioritize them

1055
01:08:19,249 --> 01:08:16,679
when we take that package of data in

1056
01:08:21,590 --> 01:08:19,259
that case and I have set up two teams

1057
01:08:24,110 --> 01:08:21,600
I'll think of this as a red team blue

1058
01:08:26,209 --> 01:08:24,120
team or a competitive analysis

1059
01:08:29,269 --> 01:08:26,219
I have an intelligence Community team

1060
01:08:32,150 --> 01:08:29,279
made up of intelligence analysts and I

1061
01:08:33,410 --> 01:08:32,160
have an s t team made up of scientists

1062
01:08:35,390 --> 01:08:33,420
and engineers and the people that

1063
01:08:37,370 --> 01:08:35,400
actually build a lot of these sensors or

1064
01:08:40,430 --> 01:08:37,380
physicists because you know if you're a

1065
01:08:41,269 --> 01:08:40,440
physicist you can do anything right

1066
01:08:44,450 --> 01:08:41,279
um

1067
01:08:46,910 --> 01:08:44,460
and but they're not associated with the

1068
01:08:49,070 --> 01:08:46,920
Intel Community they're not Intel

1069
01:08:51,229 --> 01:08:49,080
officers so they they look at this

1070
01:08:53,570 --> 01:08:51,239
through the lens of the sensor of the

1071
01:08:55,550 --> 01:08:53,580
what the data says we give that package

1072
01:08:57,289 --> 01:08:55,560
to both teams

1073
01:08:58,550 --> 01:08:57,299
the intelligence Community is going to

1074
01:09:00,410 --> 01:08:58,560
look at it through the lens of the

1075
01:09:03,349 --> 01:09:00,420
intelligence record and and what they

1076
01:09:05,030 --> 01:09:03,359
assess and their Intel tradecraft which

1077
01:09:06,709 --> 01:09:05,040
they have very specific rules and

1078
01:09:08,809 --> 01:09:06,719
regulations on how they do that

1079
01:09:10,430 --> 01:09:08,819
scientific Community Technical Community

1080
01:09:12,950 --> 01:09:10,440
is going to look at it through the lens

1081
01:09:15,709 --> 01:09:12,960
of what is the data telling me what is

1082
01:09:17,870 --> 01:09:15,719
the sensor doing what would I expect a

1083
01:09:20,809 --> 01:09:17,880
sensor response to be

1084
01:09:25,130 --> 01:09:20,819
and back that out those two groups give

1085
01:09:28,490 --> 01:09:25,140
us their answers we then adjudicate

1086
01:09:30,709 --> 01:09:28,500
if they agree then I am more likely to

1087
01:09:33,410 --> 01:09:30,719
close that case if they agree on what it

1088
01:09:35,209 --> 01:09:33,420
is if they disagree we will have an

1089
01:09:36,769 --> 01:09:35,219
adjudication we'll bring them together

1090
01:09:39,950 --> 01:09:36,779
we'll take a look at the differences

1091
01:09:41,570 --> 01:09:39,960
we'll adjudicate what why do you say one

1092
01:09:43,849 --> 01:09:41,580
thing and you say another

1093
01:09:46,729 --> 01:09:43,859
we will then come to a case

1094
01:09:49,189 --> 01:09:46,739
recommendation

1095
01:09:52,430 --> 01:09:49,199
that'll get written up by my team

1096
01:09:54,289 --> 01:09:52,440
that then goes to a senior technical

1097
01:09:56,110 --> 01:09:54,299
Advisory Group

1098
01:09:59,630 --> 01:09:56,120
which is outside of all of those people

1099
01:10:00,550 --> 01:09:59,640
made up of senior technical folks and

1100
01:10:07,689 --> 01:10:00,560
and

1101
01:10:10,610 --> 01:10:07,699
retired out of the community

1102
01:10:15,050 --> 01:10:10,620
and they they essentially peer review

1103
01:10:16,970 --> 01:10:15,060
what that case recommendation is

1104
01:10:19,669 --> 01:10:16,980
they write their recommendations that

1105
01:10:21,530 --> 01:10:19,679
comes back to me I review it we make a

1106
01:10:23,810 --> 01:10:21,540
determination and I'll sign off one way

1107
01:10:27,770 --> 01:10:23,820
or the other and then that will go out

1108
01:10:30,709 --> 01:10:27,780
as the the case determination once we

1109
01:10:33,050 --> 01:10:30,719
have an approved web portal to hang the

1110
01:10:34,910 --> 01:10:33,060
unclassified stuff we will D you know we

1111
01:10:36,470 --> 01:10:34,920
would downgrade and declassify things

1112
01:10:38,630 --> 01:10:36,480
and put it out there

1113
01:10:41,750 --> 01:10:38,640
in the meantime we're putting a lot of

1114
01:10:43,610 --> 01:10:41,760
these on our classified web portal where

1115
01:10:45,050 --> 01:10:43,620
we can then collaborate with the rest of

1116
01:10:46,910 --> 01:10:45,060
the community so they can see what's

1117
01:10:50,270 --> 01:10:46,920
going on

1118
01:10:54,350 --> 01:10:50,280
that's in a nutshell that is the process

1119
01:10:58,850 --> 01:10:56,810
because of that

1120
01:11:02,510 --> 01:10:58,860
that takes time

1121
01:11:04,610 --> 01:11:02,520
so of those over 650 you know we've

1122
01:11:10,130 --> 01:11:04,620
prioritized

1123
01:11:13,550 --> 01:11:10,140
about uh half of them to be of of

1124
01:11:15,169 --> 01:11:13,560
um anomalous interesting value

1125
01:11:17,330 --> 01:11:15,179
and now we have to go through those and

1126
01:11:21,050 --> 01:11:17,340
go how much do I have actual data for

1127
01:11:25,010 --> 01:11:21,060
because if all I have is a is a operator

1128
01:11:28,490 --> 01:11:25,020
report that says I saw X Y or Z my

1129
01:11:30,350 --> 01:11:28,500
assessment is a b or c that's not really

1130
01:11:33,410 --> 01:11:30,360
sufficient that's a good place to start

1131
01:11:35,510 --> 01:11:33,420
but I have to have data I have to have

1132
01:11:37,070 --> 01:11:35,520
radar data I have to have EO data I have

1133
01:11:39,830 --> 01:11:37,080
to have thermal data I have to have

1134
01:11:41,390 --> 01:11:39,840
overhead data and we need to look at all

1135
01:11:44,209 --> 01:11:41,400
that

1136
01:11:46,070 --> 01:11:44,219
now from a big picture perspective I

1137
01:11:47,510 --> 01:11:46,080
still have that's all very still very

1138
01:11:50,030 --> 01:11:47,520
valuable data

1139
01:11:53,450 --> 01:11:50,040
and we're looking at applying a lot of

1140
01:11:56,270 --> 01:11:53,460
things new tools analytic tools like

1141
01:11:59,270 --> 01:11:56,280
natural language processing so I can go

1142
01:12:02,090 --> 01:11:59,280
across all of those reports and look for

1143
01:12:04,610 --> 01:12:02,100
commonalities how many of them are being

1144
01:12:06,110 --> 01:12:04,620
described as round spherical objects

1145
01:12:07,910 --> 01:12:06,120
that are maneuvering how many of them

1146
01:12:12,169 --> 01:12:07,920
are not maneuvering how many of them

1147
01:12:14,930 --> 01:12:12,179
seem to have a plume to it or no

1148
01:12:16,669 --> 01:12:14,940
that's also going to be very valuable to

1149
01:12:19,149 --> 01:12:16,679
give us more of a global picture and a

1150
01:12:22,370 --> 01:12:19,159
Trends analysis of what are we seeing

1151
01:12:25,250 --> 01:12:22,380
and help us get to the determination

1152
01:12:26,090 --> 01:12:25,260
so go back to your question ma'am we

1153
01:12:27,430 --> 01:12:26,100
have

1154
01:12:30,110 --> 01:12:27,440
um

1155
01:12:32,030 --> 01:12:30,120
this next quarterly report will be

1156
01:12:33,790 --> 01:12:32,040
coming out here pretty soon our next

1157
01:12:38,750 --> 01:12:33,800
annual report

1158
01:12:40,910 --> 01:12:38,760
you all have given us moved it up to to

1159
01:12:44,090 --> 01:12:40,920
June July we're going to be having that

1160
01:12:46,550 --> 01:12:44,100
done about that time frame and we will

1161
01:12:48,830 --> 01:12:46,560
have a we'll be combining a whole number

1162
01:12:52,610 --> 01:12:48,840
of reports into that one

1163
01:12:56,689 --> 01:12:52,620
uh uh I think we're currently sitting at

1164
01:13:02,570 --> 01:12:58,970
if I remember correct we were around

1165
01:13:04,610 --> 01:13:02,580
20 to 30-ish or about halfway through

1166
01:13:06,470 --> 01:13:04,620
that analytic process

1167
01:13:08,030 --> 01:13:06,480
a handful of them have made it all the

1168
01:13:10,669 --> 01:13:08,040
way out to the other side gone through

1169
01:13:13,070 --> 01:13:10,679
peer review we've got case closure

1170
01:13:15,770 --> 01:13:13,080
reports done and signed

1171
01:13:18,770 --> 01:13:15,780
we're going to get faster as we get more

1172
01:13:21,830 --> 01:13:18,780
people on board and we get more of the

1173
01:13:25,330 --> 01:13:21,840
community tools to automate some of the

1174
01:13:31,250 --> 01:13:28,330
yeah thank you madam chair and Dr

1175
01:13:34,070 --> 01:13:31,260
Kirkpatrick the odni annual threat

1176
01:13:37,189 --> 01:13:34,080
assessment states that China's space

1177
01:13:40,030 --> 01:13:37,199
activities are designed to erode U.S

1178
01:13:43,370 --> 01:13:40,040
influence across military technological

1179
01:13:45,649 --> 01:13:43,380
economic and diplomatic spheres likewise

1180
01:13:48,830 --> 01:13:45,659
Russia will remain a key space

1181
01:13:51,169 --> 01:13:48,840
competitor in the course of your work

1182
01:13:54,050 --> 01:13:51,179
have you become aware of any Chinese or

1183
01:13:57,470 --> 01:13:54,060
Russia technical advancements to surveil

1184
01:14:00,470 --> 01:13:57,480
or attack U.S interests

1185
01:14:02,990 --> 01:14:00,480
so that's a great question part of what

1186
01:14:05,950 --> 01:14:03,000
we have to do as we go through these

1187
01:14:08,209 --> 01:14:05,960
especially the ones that show

1188
01:14:11,090 --> 01:14:08,219
signatures of advanced technical

1189
01:14:13,610 --> 01:14:11,100
capabilities is determine if there's a

1190
01:14:16,910 --> 01:14:13,620
foreign Nexus

1191
01:14:19,430 --> 01:14:16,920
that's really hard if what we observe

1192
01:14:21,890 --> 01:14:19,440
doesn't have a Chinese or Russian flag

1193
01:14:23,750 --> 01:14:21,900
on the side of it

1194
01:14:25,669 --> 01:14:23,760
now

1195
01:14:26,330 --> 01:14:25,679
I think it is

1196
01:14:28,669 --> 01:14:26,340
um

1197
01:14:34,010 --> 01:14:28,679
prudent to say

1198
01:14:35,990 --> 01:14:34,020
of the of the cases that are showing

1199
01:14:38,209 --> 01:14:36,000
it you know some sort of advanced

1200
01:14:40,550 --> 01:14:38,219
technical signature of which we're

1201
01:14:44,390 --> 01:14:40,560
talking single percentages of the entire

1202
01:14:48,530 --> 01:14:44,400
population of cases we have

1203
01:14:51,770 --> 01:14:48,540
um I am concerned about

1204
01:14:54,290 --> 01:14:51,780
what that Nexus is and I have indicators

1205
01:14:56,450 --> 01:14:54,300
that some are related to foreign

1206
01:14:59,450 --> 01:14:56,460
capabilities

1207
01:15:00,770 --> 01:14:59,460
we have to investigate that with our IC

1208
01:15:03,410 --> 01:15:00,780
partners

1209
01:15:05,510 --> 01:15:03,420
and as we get evidence to support that

1210
01:15:09,649 --> 01:15:05,520
that gets then handed off to the

1211
01:15:12,169 --> 01:15:09,659
appropriate IC agency to investigate

1212
01:15:14,750 --> 01:15:12,179
again it becomes an SCP at that point

1213
01:15:19,550 --> 01:15:14,760
yeah somebody else's problem right very

1214
01:15:22,010 --> 01:15:19,560
good thank you yes is it is it is it

1215
01:15:24,530 --> 01:15:22,020
possible that the Chinese or Russian

1216
01:15:26,450 --> 01:15:24,540
Advanced Technologies could could be

1217
01:15:29,689 --> 01:15:26,460
causing some of these anomalous

1218
01:15:35,030 --> 01:15:29,699
behaviors and and you said there seems

1219
01:15:37,850 --> 01:15:35,040
to be some indicators uh so just for us

1220
01:15:40,189 --> 01:15:37,860
today could you describe Potential

1221
01:15:44,630 --> 01:15:40,199
Threat that might exist out there if

1222
01:15:48,669 --> 01:15:46,790
in order to do this research

1223
01:15:52,729 --> 01:15:48,679
appropriately

1224
01:15:54,169 --> 01:15:52,739
we have to also be cognizant of what is

1225
01:15:57,890 --> 01:15:54,179
the state of the art and Development

1226
01:15:59,810 --> 01:15:57,900
Across the s t Community what is what

1227
01:16:03,430 --> 01:15:59,820
are the darpas of the world doing what

1228
01:16:06,590 --> 01:16:03,440
are our What's the horizon scanning of

1229
01:16:09,350 --> 01:16:06,600
emerging Technologies appropriate to

1230
01:16:11,930 --> 01:16:09,360
this subcommittee what is happening out

1231
01:16:14,689 --> 01:16:11,940
there and if somebody could accelerate

1232
01:16:16,490 --> 01:16:14,699
that capability how would that manifest

1233
01:16:18,590 --> 01:16:16,500
itself and what would it look like and

1234
01:16:20,229 --> 01:16:18,600
do those signatures match what we're

1235
01:16:23,510 --> 01:16:20,239
seeing

1236
01:16:28,070 --> 01:16:23,520
there are emerging capabilities out

1237
01:16:30,830 --> 01:16:28,080
there that that in many instances

1238
01:16:32,689 --> 01:16:30,840
Russia and China well China in

1239
01:16:36,590 --> 01:16:32,699
particular are

1240
01:16:39,169 --> 01:16:36,600
on par or ahead of us in some areas

1241
01:16:41,209 --> 01:16:39,179
all right so previously I used to be the

1242
01:16:42,770 --> 01:16:41,219
defense Department's intelligence

1243
01:16:45,290 --> 01:16:42,780
officer for Science and Technical

1244
01:16:48,649 --> 01:16:45,300
intelligence that was our job was to

1245
01:16:51,649 --> 01:16:48,659
look for what does all that look like

1246
01:16:54,110 --> 01:16:51,659
um and then you know my last several

1247
01:16:57,490 --> 01:16:54,120
years of course in in space command

1248
01:17:04,189 --> 01:17:02,270
the the adversary is not

1249
01:17:06,229 --> 01:17:04,199
waiting

1250
01:17:07,610 --> 01:17:06,239
they are advancing and they're advancing

1251
01:17:09,830 --> 01:17:07,620
quickly

1252
01:17:11,330 --> 01:17:09,840
if I were to put on some of my old hats

1253
01:17:15,110 --> 01:17:11,340
I would tell you

1254
01:17:18,169 --> 01:17:15,120
they are less risk-averse at technical

1255
01:17:20,750 --> 01:17:18,179
advancement than we are

1256
01:17:23,270 --> 01:17:20,760
they are just willing to try things and

1257
01:17:25,490 --> 01:17:23,280
see if it works are there capabilities

1258
01:17:27,649 --> 01:17:25,500
that could be employed against us in

1259
01:17:29,330 --> 01:17:27,659
both an ISR and a weapons fashion

1260
01:17:31,550 --> 01:17:29,340
absolutely

1261
01:17:34,390 --> 01:17:31,560
do I have evidence that they're doing it

1262
01:17:39,649 --> 01:17:34,400
in these cases

1263
01:17:44,090 --> 01:17:41,570
thank you I appreciate that and that's

1264
01:17:45,530 --> 01:17:44,100
that is why it's so important that you

1265
01:17:47,390 --> 01:17:45,540
are working with the intelligence

1266
01:17:49,550 --> 01:17:47,400
Community as well

1267
01:17:52,550 --> 01:17:49,560
um because you you have the science the

1268
01:17:56,209 --> 01:17:52,560
data background but you also need to

1269
01:17:58,550 --> 01:17:56,219
know from various sources what

1270
01:18:00,709 --> 01:17:58,560
adversaries may be working on is that

1271
01:18:02,630 --> 01:18:00,719
correct okay thank you thank you very

1272
01:18:04,250 --> 01:18:02,640
much thank you madam chair

1273
01:18:06,410 --> 01:18:04,260
wrote

1274
01:18:08,630 --> 01:18:06,420
uh well thank you chair gillibrand

1275
01:18:10,610 --> 01:18:08,640
ranking member Ernst this is a really

1276
01:18:13,250 --> 01:18:10,620
important hearing I'd like to thank you

1277
01:18:15,770 --> 01:18:13,260
Dr Kirkpatrick for your service to the

1278
01:18:18,709 --> 01:18:15,780
country and as a former systems analyst

1279
01:18:20,870 --> 01:18:18,719
myself I really appreciate uh your flow

1280
01:18:22,910 --> 01:18:20,880
chart the description of the process and

1281
01:18:25,310 --> 01:18:22,920
particularly the trends analysis going

1282
01:18:27,290 --> 01:18:25,320
forward how that's going to help us and

1283
01:18:29,510 --> 01:18:27,300
you've talked about language the large

1284
01:18:31,130 --> 01:18:29,520
llms the large language models of

1285
01:18:32,770 --> 01:18:31,140
artificial intelligence that's really

1286
01:18:35,810 --> 01:18:32,780
going to help us in the hunt forward

1287
01:18:38,149 --> 01:18:35,820
predictive analysis I think

1288
01:18:39,709 --> 01:18:38,159
um to some of your point what we're

1289
01:18:42,169 --> 01:18:39,719
worried about but I want to focus on

1290
01:18:45,590 --> 01:18:42,179
Nevada because uh I want to talk about

1291
01:18:47,810 --> 01:18:45,600
the impact of uaps on Aviation safety so

1292
01:18:50,450 --> 01:18:47,820
when it comes to unified unidentified

1293
01:18:52,370 --> 01:18:50,460
aerial phenomenal phenomena excuse me

1294
01:18:55,430 --> 01:18:52,380
one of my first concerns is really about

1295
01:18:57,470 --> 01:18:55,440
the safety of Nevada's military Aviator

1296
01:18:59,870 --> 01:18:57,480
so we have Airman station at Nellis Air

1297
01:19:02,149 --> 01:18:59,880
Force Base Naval aviators flying at

1298
01:19:04,689 --> 01:19:02,159
Naval Air Station Fallon and service

1299
01:19:07,130 --> 01:19:04,699
members across from across the world

1300
01:19:08,810 --> 01:19:07,140
training at the Nevada test and training

1301
01:19:10,729 --> 01:19:08,820
range I know you know all this and

1302
01:19:13,729 --> 01:19:10,739
unfortunately the existence of advanced

1303
01:19:16,610 --> 01:19:13,739
uaps in the U.S airspace and over U.S

1304
01:19:17,930 --> 01:19:16,620
military installations not a new

1305
01:19:19,970 --> 01:19:17,940
phenomenon

1306
01:19:24,229 --> 01:19:19,980
the Navy's officially acknowledged that

1307
01:19:26,870 --> 01:19:24,239
between 2004 and 2021 11 near misses

1308
01:19:29,870 --> 01:19:26,880
occurred involving uaps it required

1309
01:19:32,030 --> 01:19:29,880
pilot action and follow-up reports as a

1310
01:19:34,790 --> 01:19:32,040
result in 2019 the Navy established a

1311
01:19:37,130 --> 01:19:34,800
protocol for Pilots to report on their

1312
01:19:39,890 --> 01:19:37,140
dangerous encounters so could you speak

1313
01:19:42,169 --> 01:19:39,900
to any ongoing efforts within DOD to

1314
01:19:45,350 --> 01:19:42,179
ensure the safety of our aviators with a

1315
01:19:47,090 --> 01:19:45,360
potential UAP encounter and what's your

1316
01:19:49,189 --> 01:19:47,100
relationship with North com NORAD

1317
01:19:52,850 --> 01:19:49,199
spacecom when it comes to this immediate

1318
01:19:54,590 --> 01:19:52,860
real-time response and how they're

1319
01:19:57,350 --> 01:19:54,600
they're right there in the moment right

1320
01:19:59,689 --> 01:19:57,360
absolutely that's a great question so

1321
01:20:01,070 --> 01:19:59,699
uh let me start with

1322
01:20:03,590 --> 01:20:01,080
um you know my relationship with the

1323
01:20:05,630 --> 01:20:03,600
commands are are very good I just came

1324
01:20:07,490 --> 01:20:05,640
back from uh sitting down with with

1325
01:20:09,590 --> 01:20:07,500
General van hurk and all the all the J

1326
01:20:11,810 --> 01:20:09,600
staff out at North com a couple weeks

1327
01:20:14,450 --> 01:20:11,820
ago talking through exactly what we need

1328
01:20:15,709 --> 01:20:14,460
to do to help them get their arms around

1329
01:20:19,250 --> 01:20:15,719
us

1330
01:20:21,770 --> 01:20:19,260
we are also working very closely with

1331
01:20:24,470 --> 01:20:21,780
joint staff and the joint staff has just

1332
01:20:26,810 --> 01:20:24,480
been very outstanding in helping work

1333
01:20:30,189 --> 01:20:26,820
through policy and guidance issues to

1334
01:20:35,570 --> 01:20:32,630
and I would like to just make sure that

1335
01:20:38,930 --> 01:20:35,580
we we message back to all of the

1336
01:20:41,750 --> 01:20:38,940
operators the importance of their uh

1337
01:20:43,189 --> 01:20:41,760
reporting and the fact that you're about

1338
01:20:45,110 --> 01:20:43,199
to get a you know a bunch of new

1339
01:20:47,030 --> 01:20:45,120
requirements that we're issuing through

1340
01:20:49,130 --> 01:20:47,040
the joint staff

1341
01:20:52,430 --> 01:20:49,140
on all of the data that we're going to

1342
01:20:55,910 --> 01:20:52,440
need you to save and report back to us

1343
01:20:58,370 --> 01:20:55,920
it is invaluable and we are working to

1344
01:20:59,930 --> 01:20:58,380
try to to take the most advantage of

1345
01:21:01,189 --> 01:20:59,940
that to learn what it is that we're

1346
01:21:04,070 --> 01:21:01,199
trying to mitigate

1347
01:21:06,010 --> 01:21:04,080
to get directly to your question

1348
01:21:08,209 --> 01:21:06,020
first thing that we're doing is

1349
01:21:10,130 --> 01:21:08,219
normalizing our reporting right we're

1350
01:21:11,890 --> 01:21:10,140
standardizing our reporting and the

1351
01:21:14,030 --> 01:21:11,900
requirements associated with that

1352
01:21:16,370 --> 01:21:14,040
guidance from the doing staff I think

1353
01:21:18,229 --> 01:21:16,380
goes out maybe this week

1354
01:21:19,729 --> 01:21:18,239
um maybe next week on that we've been

1355
01:21:21,770 --> 01:21:19,739
working with them for some months that

1356
01:21:23,930 --> 01:21:21,780
does exactly what I just said gives them

1357
01:21:25,490 --> 01:21:23,940
timelines it gives them requirements it

1358
01:21:27,470 --> 01:21:25,500
gives them here's all the data you have

1359
01:21:30,229 --> 01:21:27,480
to have

1360
01:21:32,510 --> 01:21:30,239
um and you got to retain it

1361
01:21:35,570 --> 01:21:32,520
the next thing that comes after that is

1362
01:21:38,810 --> 01:21:35,580
a plan ORD that will go out to the

1363
01:21:40,370 --> 01:21:38,820
commands for mitigation and response so

1364
01:21:41,390 --> 01:21:40,380
there's a couple of things that we have

1365
01:21:46,310 --> 01:21:41,400
to do

1366
01:21:50,090 --> 01:21:46,320
one I need to work with the commands and

1367
01:21:52,610 --> 01:21:50,100
with the IC and with our outside of our

1368
01:21:54,189 --> 01:21:52,620
DOD and IC Partners to extend our

1369
01:21:57,169 --> 01:21:54,199
collection posture

1370
01:21:59,330 --> 01:21:57,179
targeted at some of these key areas that

1371
01:22:02,270 --> 01:21:59,340
you saw on that heat map

1372
01:22:05,630 --> 01:22:02,280
that have a lot of activity so that we

1373
01:22:08,209 --> 01:22:05,640
can turn on extra collection when an

1374
01:22:09,970 --> 01:22:08,219
operator sees something so part of this

1375
01:22:13,310 --> 01:22:09,980
is generating

1376
01:22:16,010 --> 01:22:13,320
as a response function what we call a

1377
01:22:18,110 --> 01:22:16,020
tactic technique and procedure for an

1378
01:22:20,209 --> 01:22:18,120
operator when he sees something calls

1379
01:22:22,610 --> 01:22:20,219
back to the operations floor they can

1380
01:22:24,830 --> 01:22:22,620
turn on additional collection what does

1381
01:22:26,689 --> 01:22:24,840
that collection look like how do I bring

1382
01:22:29,450 --> 01:22:26,699
all that together so I can get more data

1383
01:22:31,669 --> 01:22:29,460
on what is that thing can I ask really

1384
01:22:33,649 --> 01:22:31,679
quickly do you have the authorities you

1385
01:22:37,189 --> 01:22:33,659
need to extend your collection posture

1386
01:22:38,990 --> 01:22:37,199
between agencies or or branches of the

1387
01:22:41,510 --> 01:22:39,000
military because that seems to me to

1388
01:22:43,130 --> 01:22:41,520
maybe be a sticking point I know my

1389
01:22:44,350 --> 01:22:43,140
time's just about up I'd love to follow

1390
01:22:47,030 --> 01:22:44,360
up about your risk management

1391
01:22:48,950 --> 01:22:47,040
methodologies for some of these but do

1392
01:22:51,470 --> 01:22:48,960
you need any authorities that you don't

1393
01:22:52,910 --> 01:22:51,480
have to uh get get the data there are

1394
01:22:54,770 --> 01:22:52,920
some authorities that we need we

1395
01:22:56,870 --> 01:22:54,780
currently are operating under title 10

1396
01:22:58,910 --> 01:22:56,880
authorities but we have

1397
01:23:01,310 --> 01:22:58,920
um you know good relationships across

1398
01:23:03,370 --> 01:23:01,320
the other agencies but having additional

1399
01:23:04,850 --> 01:23:03,380
authorities for collection tasking

1400
01:23:06,590 --> 01:23:04,860
counterintelligence that's something

1401
01:23:07,910 --> 01:23:06,600
those are all things that would be

1402
01:23:09,890 --> 01:23:07,920
helpful yes

1403
01:23:11,810 --> 01:23:09,900
thank you to follow up Dr Kirkpatrick

1404
01:23:13,189 --> 01:23:11,820
will you help us write that language so

1405
01:23:14,630 --> 01:23:13,199
we can put it in the defense bill this

1406
01:23:18,050 --> 01:23:14,640
year so that we know what authorities

1407
01:23:19,550 --> 01:23:18,060
you need we can do that thank you

1408
01:23:20,750 --> 01:23:19,560
um we're going to start second round so

1409
01:23:22,550 --> 01:23:20,760
if you want to stay you can ask another

1410
01:23:24,290 --> 01:23:22,560
round I have at least three more

1411
01:23:26,149 --> 01:23:24,300
questions so

1412
01:23:28,850 --> 01:23:26,159
do you want to do you want to go right

1413
01:23:41,450 --> 01:23:28,860
now so in case you have to leave

1414
01:23:44,990 --> 01:23:42,310
um

1415
01:23:47,510 --> 01:23:45,000
spy balloon it did cross through the U.S

1416
01:23:50,209 --> 01:23:47,520
airspace shot down by a Sidewinder

1417
01:23:53,030 --> 01:23:50,219
missile fired from an F-22

1418
01:23:55,189 --> 01:23:53,040
Sidewinders cost us close to half a

1419
01:23:57,530 --> 01:23:55,199
million dollars each

1420
01:23:59,450 --> 01:23:57,540
so given the cost of these missiles the

1421
01:24:01,189 --> 01:23:59,460
cost per flight all of these other

1422
01:24:03,229 --> 01:24:01,199
things like I said follow up on the

1423
01:24:04,669 --> 01:24:03,239
authorities your methodologies the data

1424
01:24:07,250 --> 01:24:04,679
collection they can help us in other

1425
01:24:10,010 --> 01:24:07,260
ways but how do you think we can develop

1426
01:24:12,770 --> 01:24:10,020
a sustainable affordable response to

1427
01:24:15,169 --> 01:24:12,780
uaps where we need to

1428
01:24:17,930 --> 01:24:15,179
um that may that will definitely violate

1429
01:24:20,270 --> 01:24:17,940
our airspace not may definitely violate

1430
01:24:21,890 --> 01:24:20,280
our airspace every chance that they can

1431
01:24:23,810 --> 01:24:21,900
get because there are adversaries they

1432
01:24:26,030 --> 01:24:23,820
want this information so what do you

1433
01:24:29,450 --> 01:24:26,040
think some cost-effective measures might

1434
01:24:30,890 --> 01:24:29,460
be that we can get what we need out of

1435
01:24:32,330 --> 01:24:30,900
that or take them down whatever is

1436
01:24:34,130 --> 01:24:32,340
appropriate whatever the appropriate

1437
01:24:36,050 --> 01:24:34,140
measure is let's put it down so that

1438
01:24:37,729 --> 01:24:36,060
that is actually wrapped into the plan

1439
01:24:40,250 --> 01:24:37,739
ORD that we're working with joint staff

1440
01:24:42,649 --> 01:24:40,260
to send out what are the commands need

1441
01:24:45,830 --> 01:24:42,659
from both a capabilities perspective for

1442
01:24:49,010 --> 01:24:45,840
kinetic and non-kinetic engagements what

1443
01:24:53,330 --> 01:24:49,020
are the response functions of the of the

1444
01:24:55,310 --> 01:24:53,340
particular wings or or navy what have

1445
01:24:58,189 --> 01:24:55,320
you and then

1446
01:24:59,750 --> 01:24:58,199
what authorities do they need so one of

1447
01:25:01,850 --> 01:24:59,760
the one of the challenges that we've

1448
01:25:04,669 --> 01:25:01,860
seen is is you know there's an

1449
01:25:07,729 --> 01:25:04,679
authorities issues with the with the

1450
01:25:09,050 --> 01:25:07,739
owners operators of those ranges that

1451
01:25:13,570 --> 01:25:09,060
they need to work through and we're

1452
01:25:16,790 --> 01:25:13,580
working that with joint staff and OSD so

1453
01:25:18,410 --> 01:25:16,800
big picture we need to do all that if

1454
01:25:20,030 --> 01:25:18,420
you want to get down to the specifics

1455
01:25:21,890 --> 01:25:20,040
for you know there are non-kinetic

1456
01:25:24,729 --> 01:25:21,900
options to engage pretty much everything

1457
01:25:27,290 --> 01:25:24,739
right whether it's electronic warfare

1458
01:25:29,750 --> 01:25:27,300
whether it's you know Laser Technology

1459
01:25:32,510 --> 01:25:29,760
that's where this data having a good

1460
01:25:35,450 --> 01:25:32,520
data collection Predictive Analytics you

1461
01:25:37,310 --> 01:25:35,460
can inform make some assumptions and

1462
01:25:39,830 --> 01:25:37,320
possibilities that's right and we will

1463
01:25:41,990 --> 01:25:39,840
inform uh recommendations back to the

1464
01:25:43,970 --> 01:25:42,000
department on here's what could work

1465
01:25:46,310 --> 01:25:43,980
here's what we've seen work here's what

1466
01:25:48,410 --> 01:25:46,320
doesn't work thank you so much thank you

1467
01:25:49,250 --> 01:25:48,420
madam chair I appreciate it thank you

1468
01:25:51,410 --> 01:25:49,260
very much

1469
01:25:53,090 --> 01:25:51,420
um I just wanted to just talk a little

1470
01:25:56,030 --> 01:25:53,100
bit about your Logistics who you report

1471
01:25:58,010 --> 01:25:56,040
to how that's going uh whether you need

1472
01:25:59,510 --> 01:25:58,020
different reporting lines

1473
01:26:01,610 --> 01:25:59,520
um by Congressional legislation your

1474
01:26:03,169 --> 01:26:01,620
office is administratively located with

1475
01:26:05,090 --> 01:26:03,179
the office of the undersecretary of

1476
01:26:06,950 --> 01:26:05,100
defense for intelligence security but

1477
01:26:08,870 --> 01:26:06,960
you're not substantively subordinate to

1478
01:26:10,490 --> 01:26:08,880
the under secretary rather you are a

1479
01:26:12,169 --> 01:26:10,500
direct report to the deputy secretary

1480
01:26:13,970 --> 01:26:12,179
are you taking Direction directly from

1481
01:26:16,669 --> 01:26:13,980
the deputy secretary are you able to

1482
01:26:19,910 --> 01:26:16,679
meet and brief the deputy secretary

1483
01:26:22,010 --> 01:26:19,920
um is the office of USD ins

1484
01:26:23,750 --> 01:26:22,020
um working with you to have the right

1485
01:26:28,970 --> 01:26:23,760
framework

1486
01:26:32,450 --> 01:26:28,980
so USD ins and the uh I I currently

1487
01:26:35,750 --> 01:26:32,460
report to USD ins

1488
01:26:36,590 --> 01:26:35,760
until they come up with the the plan for

1489
01:26:39,470 --> 01:26:36,600
how they're going to implement

1490
01:26:46,310 --> 01:26:43,070
DOD and dni are working through that now

1491
01:26:49,129 --> 01:26:46,320
I'd have to refer you back to USD ins on

1492
01:26:52,390 --> 01:26:49,139
what their plan is

1493
01:26:56,870 --> 01:26:55,129
do I need to update your reporting

1494
01:26:58,129 --> 01:26:56,880
structure in the next defense bill or is

1495
01:26:59,810 --> 01:26:58,139
this something that you think will work

1496
01:27:01,430 --> 01:26:59,820
its way out or does it need further

1497
01:27:03,350 --> 01:27:01,440
Clarity I think they're planning on

1498
01:27:06,290 --> 01:27:03,360
coming back to you with an answer on

1499
01:27:08,030 --> 01:27:06,300
what that plan is and I think at that

1500
01:27:11,510 --> 01:27:08,040
time that will inform

1501
01:27:14,510 --> 01:27:11,520
what you want to do okay thank you

1502
01:27:15,770 --> 01:27:14,520
um as you know Dr Kirkpatrick Congress

1503
01:27:17,450 --> 01:27:15,780
has mandated that your office

1504
01:27:19,729 --> 01:27:17,460
established a discoverable and

1505
01:27:22,129 --> 01:27:19,739
accessible electronic method for

1506
01:27:24,950 --> 01:27:22,139
potential Witnesses of UAP incidents and

1507
01:27:26,750 --> 01:27:24,960
potential participants in government UAP

1508
01:27:28,550 --> 01:27:26,760
related activities to contact your

1509
01:27:30,649 --> 01:27:28,560
office and tell their stories

1510
01:27:31,490 --> 01:27:30,659
Congress also set up a process whereby

1511
01:27:33,950 --> 01:27:31,500
people

1512
01:27:35,510 --> 01:27:33,960
subject to non-disclosure agreements

1513
01:27:36,770 --> 01:27:35,520
preventing them from disclosing what

1514
01:27:39,169 --> 01:27:36,780
they may have witnessed or participated

1515
01:27:40,729 --> 01:27:39,179
in could tell you what they know that

1516
01:27:43,370 --> 01:27:40,739
risk of Retribution from the or

1517
01:27:44,870 --> 01:27:43,380
violation of their ndas have you

1518
01:27:46,490 --> 01:27:44,880
submitted a public-facing website

1519
01:27:49,010 --> 01:27:46,500
product for approval to your superiors

1520
01:27:52,790 --> 01:27:49,020
and how long has it been under review

1521
01:27:56,750 --> 01:27:52,800
I have we submitted the first version of

1522
01:28:00,770 --> 01:27:58,970
and do you have an estimate from them

1523
01:28:04,850 --> 01:28:00,780
when they will respond and when you'll

1524
01:28:06,530 --> 01:28:04,860
have feedback on that no I don't okay we

1525
01:28:08,570 --> 01:28:06,540
will Author a letter asking for that

1526
01:28:12,709 --> 01:28:08,580
timely response

1527
01:28:14,330 --> 01:28:12,719
um to your superiors oh when when do you

1528
01:28:16,490 --> 01:28:14,340
expect that you will establish a

1529
01:28:19,490 --> 01:28:16,500
public-facing discoverable

1530
01:28:22,970 --> 01:28:19,500
um an access portal for people to use to

1531
01:28:26,330 --> 01:28:22,980
contact your office as the law requires

1532
01:28:29,270 --> 01:28:26,340
so I would like to First say thank you

1533
01:28:31,729 --> 01:28:29,280
all very much for referring the

1534
01:28:34,189 --> 01:28:31,739
witnesses that you have thus far to us I

1535
01:28:36,649 --> 01:28:34,199
appreciate that we've brought in nearly

1536
01:28:38,750 --> 01:28:36,659
two dozen so far it's been it's been

1537
01:28:40,669 --> 01:28:38,760
very uh helpful I'd ask that you

1538
01:28:42,070 --> 01:28:40,679
continue to do that until we have an

1539
01:28:45,290 --> 01:28:42,080
approved plan

1540
01:28:48,470 --> 01:28:45,300
we have a multi-phased approach for

1541
01:28:52,669 --> 01:28:48,480
doing that that we've been uh

1542
01:28:54,250 --> 01:28:52,679
socializing have submitted for approval

1543
01:28:56,810 --> 01:28:54,260
sometime

1544
01:28:59,270 --> 01:28:56,820
and once that happens then we should be

1545
01:29:01,610 --> 01:28:59,280
able to push all that out and get uh get

1546
01:29:03,470 --> 01:29:01,620
this a little more automated great

1547
01:29:06,410 --> 01:29:03,480
um what I would ask though is as you all

1548
01:29:08,689 --> 01:29:06,420
continue to refer to us and refer

1549
01:29:12,169 --> 01:29:08,699
witnesses to us I'd appreciate if you do

1550
01:29:14,030 --> 01:29:12,179
that please try to prioritize the ones

1551
01:29:17,990 --> 01:29:14,040
that you want to do because we do have a

1552
01:29:19,729 --> 01:29:18,000
small research staff dealing with that

1553
01:29:21,709 --> 01:29:19,739
thank you

1554
01:29:23,330 --> 01:29:21,719
um and then do you have any uh plans for

1555
01:29:25,490 --> 01:29:23,340
public engagement that you want to share

1556
01:29:28,189 --> 01:29:25,500
now that you think it's important that

1557
01:29:30,890 --> 01:29:28,199
the public knows what the plan is

1558
01:29:33,669 --> 01:29:30,900
so we have a uh

1559
01:29:36,169 --> 01:29:33,679
a number of public engagement

1560
01:29:37,450 --> 01:29:36,179
recommendations uh according to our

1561
01:29:40,250 --> 01:29:37,460
strategic plan

1562
01:29:42,890 --> 01:29:40,260
all of those have been submitted for

1563
01:29:46,669 --> 01:29:42,900
approval they have to be approved by USD

1564
01:29:49,310 --> 01:29:46,679
ins we are waiting for approval to go do

1565
01:29:52,010 --> 01:29:49,320
that okay I will follow up on that

1566
01:29:53,570 --> 01:29:52,020
um and then my last question is about

1567
01:29:55,610 --> 01:29:53,580
um

1568
01:29:57,410 --> 01:29:55,620
the integration of departments UAP

1569
01:29:59,770 --> 01:29:57,420
operations research analysis and

1570
01:30:02,750 --> 01:29:59,780
strategic Communications

1571
01:30:04,669 --> 01:30:02,760
during the recent UAP incidents over

1572
01:30:07,370 --> 01:30:04,679
North America it didn't appear that you

1573
01:30:08,750 --> 01:30:07,380
were allowed to play that role do you

1574
01:30:10,370 --> 01:30:08,760
agree that the public perception is

1575
01:30:11,810 --> 01:30:10,380
generally that you and your office did

1576
01:30:13,129 --> 01:30:11,820
not appear to play a major role in the

1577
01:30:15,189 --> 01:30:13,139
Department's response to the detection

1578
01:30:17,750 --> 01:30:15,199
of objects over North America

1579
01:30:19,310 --> 01:30:17,760
what can you tell us that's going on

1580
01:30:21,709 --> 01:30:19,320
behind the scenes from your perspective

1581
01:30:24,169 --> 01:30:21,719
and in the after action assessment

1582
01:30:25,610 --> 01:30:24,179
process is there awareness that there is

1583
01:30:27,890 --> 01:30:25,620
a need to operate differently in the

1584
01:30:29,890 --> 01:30:27,900
future and a commitment to doing so

1585
01:30:32,990 --> 01:30:29,900
foreign

1586
01:30:36,770 --> 01:30:33,000
objects were first detected I got called

1587
01:30:40,669 --> 01:30:36,780
by joint staff leadership uh to come in

1588
01:30:42,830 --> 01:30:40,679
uh late one night to review events as

1589
01:30:46,129 --> 01:30:42,840
they were unfo unfolding and to give

1590
01:30:48,070 --> 01:30:46,139
them a you know an assessment based on

1591
01:30:51,530 --> 01:30:48,080
what we knew at that time

1592
01:30:55,250 --> 01:30:51,540
I did that I worked with the director of

1593
01:30:57,890 --> 01:30:55,260
joint staff the J2 and the j3 that night

1594
01:31:00,350 --> 01:30:57,900
and over the couple of following days on

1595
01:31:02,570 --> 01:31:00,360
what are the types of things that we are

1596
01:31:05,270 --> 01:31:02,580
tracking from a unidentified object

1597
01:31:07,790 --> 01:31:05,280
perspective what databases do we use

1598
01:31:10,970 --> 01:31:07,800
those sorts of things for for Norm for

1599
01:31:12,490 --> 01:31:10,980
known objects known tracking

1600
01:31:15,709 --> 01:31:12,500
um

1601
01:31:17,510 --> 01:31:15,719
beyond that the response I would have to

1602
01:31:19,910 --> 01:31:17,520
I would have to refer you back to the

1603
01:31:23,810 --> 01:31:19,920
White House for the decision on how they

1604
01:31:26,629 --> 01:31:23,820
did the response we did not play a role

1605
01:31:28,010 --> 01:31:26,639
in what you would respond other than

1606
01:31:28,669 --> 01:31:28,020
that initial

1607
01:31:30,649 --> 01:31:28,679
um

1608
01:31:35,750 --> 01:31:30,659
you know advice on what we are seeing

1609
01:31:42,470 --> 01:31:38,990
thank you Matt thank you madam chair

1610
01:31:45,169 --> 01:31:42,480
um Dr Kirkpatrick I I know that your

1611
01:31:48,470 --> 01:31:45,179
office has gotten a lot of attention uh

1612
01:31:50,990 --> 01:31:48,480
recently and of course any new agency

1613
01:31:53,930 --> 01:31:51,000
there tends to be a push to increase

1614
01:31:55,729 --> 01:31:53,940
size and and funding

1615
01:31:58,550 --> 01:31:55,739
um we want to make sure that you're able

1616
01:32:00,770 --> 01:31:58,560
to meet your goals but what I also need

1617
01:32:04,669 --> 01:32:00,780
to ensure is that we're not duplicating

1618
01:32:08,629 --> 01:32:04,679
or replicating existing functions and

1619
01:32:11,689 --> 01:32:08,639
creating redundancy within DOD and the

1620
01:32:14,689 --> 01:32:11,699
interagency so what steps are you taking

1621
01:32:18,830 --> 01:32:14,699
right now to make sure that your

1622
01:32:22,669 --> 01:32:18,840
particular office and function is is

1623
01:32:25,129 --> 01:32:22,679
unique uh to any of the other agencies

1624
01:32:27,050 --> 01:32:25,139
that might be involved in these types of

1625
01:32:30,590 --> 01:32:27,060
cases yeah that's a that's a great

1626
01:32:32,750 --> 01:32:30,600
question so I would like to lay down

1627
01:32:34,910 --> 01:32:32,760
here's here's what am I

1628
01:32:38,629 --> 01:32:34,920
so my mission and my goal and my vision

1629
01:32:40,189 --> 01:32:38,639
here so the vision is at one point at

1630
01:32:43,010 --> 01:32:40,199
some point in the future

1631
01:32:45,169 --> 01:32:43,020
you should not need an arrow if I'm

1632
01:32:47,390 --> 01:32:45,179
successful in what I'm doing we should

1633
01:32:49,790 --> 01:32:47,400
be able to normalize everything that

1634
01:32:52,790 --> 01:32:49,800
we're doing into existing processes

1635
01:32:54,470 --> 01:32:52,800
functions agencies and organizations and

1636
01:32:57,050 --> 01:32:54,480
make that part of their mission and

1637
01:33:00,890 --> 01:32:57,060
their role right now the niche that we

1638
01:33:03,530 --> 01:33:00,900
form is really going after the unknowns

1639
01:33:07,189 --> 01:33:03,540
if you I think you articulated it early

1640
01:33:09,229 --> 01:33:07,199
on this is a Hunt mission for what might

1641
01:33:10,970 --> 01:33:09,239
somebody be doing in our backyard that

1642
01:33:13,370 --> 01:33:10,980
we don't know about

1643
01:33:15,830 --> 01:33:13,380
all right well that that that is what we

1644
01:33:17,629 --> 01:33:15,840
are doing right but at some point we

1645
01:33:19,490 --> 01:33:17,639
should be able to normalize that that's

1646
01:33:21,649 --> 01:33:19,500
why it's so important the work we're

1647
01:33:25,490 --> 01:33:21,659
doing with joint staff to normalize that

1648
01:33:27,890 --> 01:33:25,500
into uh Paula DOD policy and guidance

1649
01:33:30,169 --> 01:33:27,900
we are bringing in all of our

1650
01:33:33,350 --> 01:33:30,179
interagency partners so NASA is

1651
01:33:36,050 --> 01:33:33,360
providing a liaison for us I have FBI

1652
01:33:37,910 --> 01:33:36,060
liaison I have OSI or liaison I have

1653
01:33:41,149 --> 01:33:37,920
service Liaisons

1654
01:33:42,290 --> 01:33:41,159
the ice half of my staff come from the

1655
01:33:44,930 --> 01:33:42,300
IC

1656
01:33:46,850 --> 01:33:44,940
half of my staff come from other

1657
01:33:49,790 --> 01:33:46,860
scientific and Technical backgrounds I

1658
01:33:51,590 --> 01:33:49,800
have doe and so what we're trying to do

1659
01:33:56,209 --> 01:33:51,600
is Ensure

1660
01:33:58,970 --> 01:33:56,219
again as I make UAP into sap they get

1661
01:34:01,010 --> 01:33:58,980
handed off to the people that that is

1662
01:34:02,810 --> 01:34:01,020
their mission to go do

1663
01:34:05,030 --> 01:34:02,820
so that we aren't duplicating that I'm

1664
01:34:06,950 --> 01:34:05,040
not going to go chase the Chinese high

1665
01:34:09,350 --> 01:34:06,960
altitude balloon for example that's not

1666
01:34:11,930 --> 01:34:09,360
my job it's not an unknown and it's not

1667
01:34:14,930 --> 01:34:11,940
anomalous anymore now it goes over to

1668
01:34:16,790 --> 01:34:14,940
them very good thank you madam chair

1669
01:34:20,090 --> 01:34:16,800
thank you

1670
01:34:21,950 --> 01:34:20,100
um I wanted just to follow up on the

1671
01:34:24,350 --> 01:34:21,960
filters for surveillance outside

1672
01:34:26,870 --> 01:34:24,360
observers have speculated that DOD sets

1673
01:34:28,550 --> 01:34:26,880
filters on certain sensors to eliminate

1674
01:34:30,790 --> 01:34:28,560
objects that are moving really fast or

1675
01:34:32,990 --> 01:34:30,800
slow because what we are looking for

1676
01:34:36,229 --> 01:34:33,000
militarily are conventional aircraft and

1677
01:34:38,510 --> 01:34:36,239
missiles UAP that doesn't fit into these

1678
01:34:40,850 --> 01:34:38,520
programs would thereby be weeded out and

1679
01:34:42,410 --> 01:34:40,860
never noticed the special speculation

1680
01:34:44,390 --> 01:34:42,420
was proven to be true during the UAP

1681
01:34:46,550 --> 01:34:44,400
incidents over North America where DOD

1682
01:34:48,830 --> 01:34:46,560
publicly acknowledged that we were able

1683
01:34:50,890 --> 01:34:48,840
to start seeing these uops only when we

1684
01:34:53,209 --> 01:34:50,900
opened up these filters

1685
01:34:55,070 --> 01:34:53,219
obviously our military operators cannot

1686
01:34:57,110 --> 01:34:55,080
be overloaded with objects that are not

1687
01:34:58,850 --> 01:34:57,120
conventional aircraft or missiles can

1688
01:35:01,129 --> 01:34:58,860
you nonetheless make sure that the raw

1689
01:35:02,750 --> 01:35:01,139
data is being captured and subsequently

1690
01:35:05,450 --> 01:35:02,760
processed that your office knows what's

1691
01:35:07,010 --> 01:35:05,460
really out there and is that going to

1692
01:35:10,970 --> 01:35:07,020
cost money will you expect to pay for

1693
01:35:16,189 --> 01:35:13,729
one of the key tenets that we're trying

1694
01:35:18,470 --> 01:35:16,199
to do in our science plan is understand

1695
01:35:22,189 --> 01:35:18,480
what those signatures are

1696
01:35:25,610 --> 01:35:22,199
so we get all the raw for example radar

1697
01:35:27,830 --> 01:35:25,620
data prior to the scrubbing and

1698
01:35:31,129 --> 01:35:27,840
filtering to allow it to enter into our

1699
01:35:34,129 --> 01:35:31,139
weapon systems and our detection systems

1700
01:35:36,890 --> 01:35:34,139
we are now taking all that data and

1701
01:35:38,570 --> 01:35:36,900
cross-correlating it to what pilots are

1702
01:35:43,070 --> 01:35:38,580
saying they're seeing or other

1703
01:35:45,830 --> 01:35:43,080
observations from other operators

1704
01:35:48,590 --> 01:35:45,840
what that allows us to do is then see if

1705
01:35:52,430 --> 01:35:48,600
there are any any signatures in that

1706
01:35:54,169 --> 01:35:52,440
data that I can pull out generate uh

1707
01:35:56,990 --> 01:35:54,179
what we'll call automatic Target

1708
01:35:59,689 --> 01:35:57,000
recognition algorithms that allow us to

1709
01:36:05,390 --> 01:35:59,699
then use that signature associated with

1710
01:36:07,610 --> 01:36:05,400
a observed UAP whatever that UAP may be

1711
01:36:10,729 --> 01:36:07,620
we will then make those recommendations

1712
01:36:12,709 --> 01:36:10,739
of what those changes should be back to

1713
01:36:16,490 --> 01:36:12,719
the department so the deputy secretary

1714
01:36:17,990 --> 01:36:16,500
had asked me last October to make those

1715
01:36:21,890 --> 01:36:18,000
recommendations what changes do we need

1716
01:36:24,470 --> 01:36:21,900
to make to Radars to uh platforms to

1717
01:36:26,570 --> 01:36:24,480
detection systems and algorithms to pull

1718
01:36:28,430 --> 01:36:26,580
on those those algorithms make those

1719
01:36:29,629 --> 01:36:28,440
changes that's going to take some time

1720
01:36:32,149 --> 01:36:29,639
that's where the research and

1721
01:36:34,850 --> 01:36:32,159
development comes in right it's not

1722
01:36:36,110 --> 01:36:34,860
it's not instantaneous right now a lot

1723
01:36:44,870 --> 01:36:36,120
of the

1724
01:36:47,750 --> 01:36:44,880
ranges of those filters have been

1725
01:36:49,790 --> 01:36:47,760
identified by people in the loop and you

1726
01:36:51,950 --> 01:36:49,800
can't have people in the loop all the

1727
01:36:53,390 --> 01:36:51,960
time you can you know it's just not cost

1728
01:36:56,330 --> 01:36:53,400
effective

1729
01:36:58,790 --> 01:36:56,340
so part of our budget is working through

1730
01:37:00,590 --> 01:36:58,800
what is what does that look like

1731
01:37:03,169 --> 01:37:00,600
and then making those recommendations

1732
01:37:08,090 --> 01:37:03,179
back to the big program offices for them

1733
01:37:11,450 --> 01:37:10,129
my last question is about the academic

1734
01:37:13,310 --> 01:37:11,460
Community

1735
01:37:14,810 --> 01:37:13,320
um can you give us an update on sort of

1736
01:37:17,990 --> 01:37:14,820
how you collaborate with the academic

1737
01:37:19,910 --> 01:37:18,000
community and whether how the

1738
01:37:23,510 --> 01:37:19,920
independent study being done by NASA

1739
01:37:25,370 --> 01:37:23,520
complements arrows work sure

1740
01:37:27,550 --> 01:37:25,380
two questions so I'm going to try to

1741
01:37:29,330 --> 01:37:27,560
make it quick the uh

1742
01:37:32,930 --> 01:37:29,340
1979

1743
01:37:35,810 --> 01:37:32,940
Carl Sagan said extraordinary claims

1744
01:37:37,669 --> 01:37:35,820
require extraordinary evidence

1745
01:37:40,729 --> 01:37:37,679
I would go one step further and I would

1746
01:37:41,990 --> 01:37:40,739
say extraordinary claims require not

1747
01:37:44,090 --> 01:37:42,000
only extraordinary evidence but

1748
01:37:46,070 --> 01:37:44,100
extraordinary science and so how do you

1749
01:37:48,770 --> 01:37:46,080
do that you do that with the scientific

1750
01:37:51,350 --> 01:37:48,780
method right and so as arrow is

1751
01:37:55,490 --> 01:37:51,360
developing and implementing its science

1752
01:37:58,129 --> 01:37:55,500
plan it has to do so grounded in a solid

1753
01:38:01,250 --> 01:37:58,139
foundation of scientific theory across

1754
01:38:04,610 --> 01:38:01,260
the entire range of hypotheses

1755
01:38:06,830 --> 01:38:04,620
that have been presented for what UAP

1756
01:38:10,850 --> 01:38:06,840
are

1757
01:38:14,629 --> 01:38:10,860
that range spans adversary breakthrough

1758
01:38:17,149 --> 01:38:14,639
technology on one hand known objects and

1759
01:38:18,590 --> 01:38:17,159
phenomena in the middle all the way to

1760
01:38:20,450 --> 01:38:18,600
the extreme theories of

1761
01:38:24,950 --> 01:38:20,460
extraterrestrials

1762
01:38:26,750 --> 01:38:24,960
all of that has physics-based signatures

1763
01:38:29,750 --> 01:38:26,760
associated with it whether it's

1764
01:38:32,390 --> 01:38:29,760
theoretical from the academic community

1765
01:38:33,610 --> 01:38:32,400
known from things like Hypersonic

1766
01:38:37,070 --> 01:38:33,620
weapons

1767
01:38:39,590 --> 01:38:37,080
or adversary breakthrough Technologies

1768
01:38:41,930 --> 01:38:39,600
as we've talked about before

1769
01:38:43,310 --> 01:38:41,940
the known objects that we have to go

1770
01:38:46,490 --> 01:38:43,320
measure

1771
01:38:50,149 --> 01:38:46,500
the idea is across that entire range you

1772
01:38:53,270 --> 01:38:50,159
have to come up with peer-reviewed

1773
01:38:55,669 --> 01:38:53,280
scientific basis for all of it the

1774
01:38:58,610 --> 01:38:55,679
academic Community plays a very big role

1775
01:39:00,470 --> 01:38:58,620
on the one end of the spectrum

1776
01:39:02,810 --> 01:39:00,480
the intelligence community on the other

1777
01:39:03,830 --> 01:39:02,820
end of the spectrum and then measurement

1778
01:39:07,129 --> 01:39:03,840
in the middle

1779
01:39:11,350 --> 01:39:07,139
once I have those signatures identified

1780
01:39:13,669 --> 01:39:11,360
in invalidated peer-reviewed

1781
01:39:15,950 --> 01:39:13,679
documents then I have something to point

1782
01:39:17,510 --> 01:39:15,960
to for all that data

1783
01:39:19,370 --> 01:39:17,520
because all that data is going to match

1784
01:39:21,709 --> 01:39:19,380
one of those signatures

1785
01:39:24,709 --> 01:39:21,719
right and then I can go well it's that

1786
01:39:27,770 --> 01:39:24,719
and not that or it's that

1787
01:39:31,189 --> 01:39:27,780
and that helps us go through all that

1788
01:39:34,490 --> 01:39:31,199
where NASA comes in and and the the

1789
01:39:37,850 --> 01:39:34,500
study that they're doing which I'm

1790
01:39:39,290 --> 01:39:37,860
uh supporting is

1791
01:39:43,189 --> 01:39:39,300
really

1792
01:39:46,070 --> 01:39:43,199
um looking at the unclassified data

1793
01:39:49,070 --> 01:39:46,080
sources that might be used to augment

1794
01:39:51,110 --> 01:39:49,080
our classified data sources to

1795
01:39:53,450 --> 01:39:51,120
understand if there's a signature there

1796
01:39:56,930 --> 01:39:53,460
we can pull on so very similar to The

1797
01:39:59,390 --> 01:39:56,940
Radars but

1798
01:40:01,729 --> 01:39:59,400
civil capabilities so for example we

1799
01:40:04,370 --> 01:40:01,739
have a lot of climate science satellites

1800
01:40:07,669 --> 01:40:04,380
for example that look at Earth

1801
01:40:10,669 --> 01:40:07,679
lots of them how many of those

1802
01:40:14,090 --> 01:40:10,679
is the data valuable

1803
01:40:17,450 --> 01:40:14,100
in seeing these kinds of objects

1804
01:40:20,270 --> 01:40:17,460
the challenge in that is those those

1805
01:40:22,189 --> 01:40:20,280
platforms don't necessarily have the

1806
01:40:24,830 --> 01:40:22,199
resolution you need so if you remember

1807
01:40:26,930 --> 01:40:24,840
the slide I put up there with the trends

1808
01:40:29,930 --> 01:40:26,940
the size of the objects we're looking

1809
01:40:31,550 --> 01:40:29,940
for are typically reported to be one to

1810
01:40:33,770 --> 01:40:31,560
four meters

1811
01:40:36,649 --> 01:40:33,780
well the resolution of many of the

1812
01:40:39,169 --> 01:40:36,659
climate science civil um science you

1813
01:40:41,270 --> 01:40:39,179
know civil satellites was much larger

1814
01:40:42,890 --> 01:40:41,280
than that which means you'd have a hard

1815
01:40:46,310 --> 01:40:42,900
time picking out something that's

1816
01:40:48,649 --> 01:40:46,320
smaller than a pixel on the imagery on

1817
01:40:51,050 --> 01:40:48,659
the data that's not to say all of it's

1818
01:40:52,550 --> 01:40:51,060
not useful and there are ways of pulling

1819
01:40:54,590 --> 01:40:52,560
through that data and going through that

1820
01:40:57,709 --> 01:40:54,600
is what NASA is focused on right now

1821
01:40:59,689 --> 01:40:57,719
what is what are some other data sources

1822
01:41:03,530 --> 01:40:59,699
that could be used in addition things

1823
01:41:06,050 --> 01:41:03,540
like open source and crowdsourcing of of

1824
01:41:07,850 --> 01:41:06,060
data we're exploring public-private

1825
01:41:09,530 --> 01:41:07,860
Partnerships ma'am as you know we've

1826
01:41:14,709 --> 01:41:09,540
talked about in the past

1827
01:41:17,149 --> 01:41:14,719
to look at is there a way to smartly

1828
01:41:18,770 --> 01:41:17,159
crowdsource additional data that might

1829
01:41:22,790 --> 01:41:18,780
be useful

1830
01:41:25,010 --> 01:41:22,800
to augment some of my classified sources

1831
01:41:26,570 --> 01:41:25,020
and what does that look like and how

1832
01:41:29,090 --> 01:41:26,580
would we do it so that we're not

1833
01:41:36,229 --> 01:41:29,100
overwhelmed by you know everybody who

1834
01:41:38,870 --> 01:41:38,030
like to tell the committee before we

1835
01:41:40,550 --> 01:41:38,880
close

1836
01:41:41,390 --> 01:41:40,560
or do you have another round yeah do you

1837
01:41:43,370 --> 01:41:41,400
have anything else you'd like to tell

1838
01:41:45,530 --> 01:41:43,380
the committee before we close thank you

1839
01:41:47,629 --> 01:41:45,540
very much for allowing us to come and

1840
01:41:49,490 --> 01:41:47,639
share a little bit of insight into what

1841
01:41:50,930 --> 01:41:49,500
arrow is up to and what we're doing I

1842
01:41:53,209 --> 01:41:50,940
hope to be able to share a whole lot

1843
01:41:55,609 --> 01:41:53,219
more in the future

1844
01:41:57,890 --> 01:41:55,619
um we have a lot of work to do so if you

1845
01:42:00,290 --> 01:41:57,900
don't hear from me outside it's because

1846
01:42:02,209 --> 01:42:00,300
we've got a lot of work to do

1847
01:44:08,750 --> 01:42:02,219
well thank you so much Dr Patrick thank

1848
01:44:08,760 --> 01:44:15,370
foreign

1849
01:44:15,380 --> 01:46:07,640
useful and there are ways of

1850
01:47:14,709 --> 01:46:09,670
[Music]

1851
01:47:14,719 --> 01:47:19,090
thank you

1852
01:47:24,470 --> 01:47:21,770
the somewhere in the skies podcast is

1853
01:47:26,570 --> 01:47:24,480
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1854
01:47:29,450 --> 01:47:26,580
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01:47:31,010 --> 01:47:29,460
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01:47:33,649 --> 01:47:31,020
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01:47:36,830 --> 01:47:33,659
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1858
01:47:40,010 --> 01:47:36,840
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01:47:42,770 --> 01:47:40,020
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1860
01:47:45,950 --> 01:47:42,780
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01:47:49,209 --> 01:47:45,960
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1862
01:47:50,850 --> 01:47:49,219
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1863
01:48:10,560 --> 01:47:50,860
somewhere Skies

1864
01:48:44,330 --> 01:48:11,770
[Music]

1865
01:48:44,340 --> 01:48:49,940
foreign

1866
01:49:25,010 --> 01:48:58,280
[Music]

1867
01:49:46,620 --> 01:49:25,020
foreign

1868
01:49:49,950 --> 01:49:48,750
[Music]

1869
01:49:56,870 --> 01:49:49,960
[Applause]

1870
01:49:58,120 --> 01:49:56,880
[Music]

1871
01:50:00,990 --> 01:49:58,130
foreign

1872
01:50:01,450 --> 01:50:01,000
[Music]

1873
01:50:09,370 --> 01:50:01,460
[Applause]

1874
01:50:11,320 --> 01:50:09,380
[Music]

1875
01:50:14,920 --> 01:50:11,330
[Applause]

1876
01:50:18,310 --> 01:50:14,930
[Music]

1877
01:50:18,310 --> 01:50:18,320
[Applause]

1878
01:50:18,320 --> 01:50:26,330
[Music]